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HARKESH MANUJA, J. (ORAL)

1. By way of present revision petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenge has been laid to an order dated 28.02.2018 passed by the learned Executing Court-cum-Additional District Judge, Amritsar whereby, the execution petition preferred at the instance of petitioners-landowners was declined, being barred by limitation.

2. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the paper book.

3. In the present case, admittedly, some land owned by the petitioners forming part of the revenue estate of village Khurmania, Tehsil and District Amritsar came to be acquired. Award under Section 11 was passed by Land Acquisition Collector (for short ‘the LAC’) on 28.03.1978. Thereafter, reference under Section 18 was decided on 24.12.1981 and the Regular First Appeal No. 792 of 1981 preferred against the order passed by the Reference Court, was later decided on 01.05.1989 by this Court followed by an intra-court appeal (LPA) decided on 15.10.1996, whereby the market value was reassessed at the rate of Rs,40,000/- per acre for all kinds of land. Aggrieved thereof, the respondents-Union of India, approached the Hon'ble Apex Court and their appeals were dismissed vide decision dated 26.10.2005 passed in Civil Appeal No.3343-3554 of 1999 titled as “Union of India Vs. Harinder Pal Singh and Ors.”. Subsequently, on 01.09.2016, the execution application was filed by the petitioners which were held to be time-barred by the learned Executing Court-Cum-Additional District Judge, Amritsar.

4. The issue that arises for consideration is with regard to the starting point of limitation for filing the execution petition. The statutory provision dealing with the subject i.e. Article 136 of Schedule I the Limitation Act, 1963. The same is reproduced hereunder:-

5. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.10442 of 2011 titled as “Shanthi Vs. T.D. Vishwanathan and Ors.” as well as Civil Appeal No. 3424 of 2026 titled as “Gajanan vs. Prahlad,” based on doctrine of merger is clearly attracted in such cases. The relevant excerpt from Gajanan’s case (supra) is reproduced hereunder:-

“16.The limitation period provided for filing for execution of any decree or order under Article 136 of the 1963 Act is 12 years, and the period of limitation begins to run from the date when the decree or order becomes enforceable. It is settled law that when an appeal is preferred against such decree, the decree of the Trial Court generally merges into the appellate decree. However, in the present case, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal in default on 25.11.2004.

17. While it is undisputed that there was no stay on the operation of the decree of the Trial Court during the pendency of the appeal and the said decree remained enforceable, the dismissal of such appeal, albeit in default, reset the limitation clock for filing of the execution proceedings as it had the effect of confirming the decree of the Trial Court.

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21. The upshot of this discussion is that an appeal is intrinsically a continuation of the suit and thus, even if an appeal against an order or decree of the Trial Court is dismissed on any preliminary or technical ground, such as limitation o