IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH.

Date of Decision:- 22.04.2026 NAZRA ......APPELLANT VS.

BIMLA RANI AND ORS. ......RESPONDENTS CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASJIT SINGH BEDI Present:- Mr. Tejinder Pal Singh, Advocate for the applicant-appellant.

***

JASJIT SINGH BEDI, J.(ORAL)

CRM-9105-2018 This is an application under Section 05 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 114 days in filing the appeal.

For the reasons mentioned in the application, the same is allowed and the delay of 114 days in fling the appeal is hereby condoned.

Main Case

1. The present application has been preferred under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter ‘CR.P.C.’) seeking grant of leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated 24.08.2017 passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Naraingarh, District Ambala in a case stemming from complaint dated 19.02.2009/12.05.2015 filed under Sections 323, 445, 448, 452, 506 and

120-B IPC.

2. The complaint (supra) was filed on the ground of encroachment and assault by the accused. After assessing all the material available on the record, the trial Court acquitted the respondent vide judgment dated 24.08.2017.

3. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. Celestium Financial vs. A.Gnanasekaran Etc., 2025(3) RCR (Criminal) 208, after considerable discussion and comparative interpretation of Sections 372 and 378(4) of Cr.P.C., concluded that the victim has a right to file an appeal under Section 372 of Cr.P.C. before the Court of Sessions. Speaking through Justice B.V. Nagarathna, the following was held:

“7.12 The reasons for the above distinction are not far to see and can be elaborated as follows:

Firstly, the victim of a crime must have an absolute right to prefer an appeal which cannot be circumscribed by any condition precedent. In the instant case, a victim under Section 138 of the Act, i.e., a payee or the holder of a cheque is a person who has suffered the impact of the offence committed by a person who is charged of the offence, namely, the accused, whose cheque has been dishonoured.

Secondly, the right of a victim of a crime must be placed on par with the right of an accused who has suffered a conviction, who, as a matter of right can prefer an appeal under Section 374 of the CrPC. A person convicted of a crime has the right to prefer an appeal under Section 374 as a matter of right and not being subjected to any conditions.

Similarly, a victim of a crime, whatever be the nature of the crime, unconditionally must have a right to prefer an appeal.

Thirdly, it is for this reason that the Parliament thought it fit to insert the proviso to sub-section 372 without mandating any condition precedent to be fulfilled by the victim of an offence, which expression also includes the legal representatives of a deceased victim who can prefer an appeal.

On the contrary, as against an order of acquittal, the State, through the Public Prosecutor can prefer an appeal even if the complainant does not prefer such an appeal, though of course such an appeal is with the leave of the court. However, it is not always necessary for the State or a complainant to prefer an appeal. But when it comes to a victim's right to prefer an appeal, the insistence on seeking special leave to appeal from the High Court under Section 378(4) of the CrPC would be contrary to what has been intended by the Parliament by insertion of the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC.

Fourthly, the Parliament has not amended Section 378 to circumscribe the victim's right to prefer an appeal just as it has with regard to a complainant or the State filing an appeal. On the other hand, the Parliament has inserted the proviso to Section 372 so as to envisage a superior right for the victim of an offence to prefer an appeal on the grounds mentioned therein as compared to a complainant.

Fifthly, the involvement of the State in respect of an offence under Section 138 of the Act is conspicuous by its absence. This is b