2026 Supreme(Online)(P&H) 87889
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Surya Partap Singh, J
Devender Khurana – Appellant
Versus
Kuldeep Kumar Jain – Respondent
Criminal Misc. No. M-42803 of 2023
Important Points
Subject
Criminal Law - Negotiable Instruments Act - Interim Compensation
Act Referred
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: S.482, S.421
Headnote
(B) Appellate Jurisdiction - High Court’s power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Scope of interference - Appellate court should not interfere with the trial court’s discretionary order unless it is found to be perverse or contrary to law - Mere possibility of a different view does not justify interference. (Paras 10, 24, 25)
Facts of the case:
The petitioner challenged an order directing him to pay 20% of the cheque amount as interim compensation under Section 143A of the NI Act in a complaint under Section 138. The petitioner argued that the order was perverse, ignored his financial condition, and failed to consider that the dispute was civil in nature. The respondent contended that the petitioner had issued fresh cheques after a previous compromise/memorandum of understanding, evidencing malafide intent and a strong case on merits.
Findings of Court:
The Court found that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. The existence of a prior compromise and the issuance of fresh cheques established a prima facie case for the complainant. The petitioner failed to demonstrate a plausible defence, and the circumstances did not render the 20% compensation award harsh or inequitable.
Issues: Whether the trial court was competent to issue an interim compensation order and whether the judicial discretion under Section 143A of the NI Act was exercised correctly.
Ratio Decidendi: While the power to grant interim compensation under Section 143A is discretionary and not mandatory, it is legally permissible. The court must evaluate the merits of the complaint, the accused's defence, and the transaction's history before granting such relief. In this case, the prior breach of a memorandum of understanding justified the trial court's order.
Result: Petition dismissed.
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Neeraj Gupta, Gaurav Gupta
For the Respondents: Mohit Kakkar
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. procedural background of the section 482 petition and the impugned orders. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5) |
| 2. petitioner's arguments focusing on the discretionary nature of section 143a relief. (Para 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11) |
| 3. respondent's counter arguments highlighting factual conduct and breach of settlement. (Para 12 , 13) |
| 4. scope of section 143a and the court's jurisdiction to award interim compensation. (Para 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19) |
| 5. guidelines for courts to exercise discretion in granting interim compensation. (Para 20 , 21 , 22) |
| 6. application of legal principles to the case and final decision. (Para 23 , 24 , 25 , 26) |
1. The instant petition under Section 482 of ‘the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973’, hereinafter being referred to as “Cr.P.C.” only, has been filed for quashing of judgment dated 07.08.2023 passed by the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram, in a criminal revision petition preferred by the petitioner. By virtue of above-mentioned judgment a revision petition, filed by the petitioner has been dismissed.
2. In addition to above, the order dated 04.07.2023, hereinafter being referred to as ‘the impugned order’ only, passed by the court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Gurugram, hereinafter being referred to as ‘the trial Court’ only, has also been challenged. The petitioner, while seeking the setting aside of both the above-mentioned orders, has sought for dismissal of application under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, hereinafter being referred to as ‘the NI Act’ only.
3. In nut-shell, the facts emerging from the record are that, for the commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, a complaint has been filed by the respondent/complainant, hereinafter being referred to as ‘the respondent’ only, against the petitioner/accused, hereinafter being referred to as ‘the petitioner’ only. The above-mentioned complaint has been filed on the premise that in discharge of his legally enforceable debt, the cheque was issued in favour of the respondent, and that the above-mentioned cheque, when presented before the Banker of the petitioner, was dishonoured. It has also been alleged by the respondent that on receipt of information with regard to dishonour of cheque, a notice was served upon the petitioner, calling him upon to make the payment of requisite amount, but the petitioner failed to do so and therefore, the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act has been filed.
4. In the above-mentioned complaint, the petitioner also filed an application under Section 143A of the NI Act. By virtue of above-mentioned application, the respondent sought for a direction to the petitioner to pay 20% of the cheque amount. The above-mentioned application filed by the respondent has been allowed by the learned trial Court by virtue of order dated 04.07.2023 (i.e. by virtue of impugned order). Vide impugned order, the petitioner has been directed to pay 20% of the cheque amount.
5. Aggrieved of the above-mentioned impugned order the Revision Petition No. 109 dated 01.08.2023 was preferred by the petitioner in the court of Sessions. The above-mentioned revision petition was dealt with by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurugram. However, by virtue of order dated 07.08.2023, while upholding the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court, the revision petition was dismissed. Hence, the present petition.
6. Heard.
7. It has been contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court, as well as by the learned revisional court, are perverse and contrary to the principles of law. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, while passing the impugned order, the learned trial Court the learned revisional court failed to appreciate the fact that under Section 143A of the NI Act, the highest limit for payment is 20% of the cheque amount, and that it is not mandatory for t