MANDEEP PANNU, J. (Oral)

1. The present transfer application has been filed by the applicant-petitioner under Section 24 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, seeking transfer of Domestic Violence Case No. 139 of 2025, titled ‘Punita Mittal versus Ashutosh Mittal and others’, pending before the Court of Shri Abhishek Chaudhary, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gurugram, to the Court of Ms. Poonam Kanwar, learned Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Gurugram, where a petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), between the same parties is stated to be pending adjudication.

2. The case set up by the applicant is that the parties to the present application are involved in matrimonial litigation and, apart from the proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 'the DV Act'), a petition seeking maintenance between them is also pending before the Family Court, Gurugram. It is contended that the allegations and the factual background involved in both the proceedings are substantially overlapping and that the evidence required to be led in the two matters would also be similar. According to the applicant, continuation of the two proceedings before different courts would result in multiplicity of litigation, unnecessary expenditure and inconvenience to the parties and may also give rise to conflicting findings on the same set of facts. It is, therefore, submitted that the interest of justice would be better served if both the matters are heard by the same court.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant has further contended that the Family Court is competent to grant reliefs contemplated under Sections 18 to 22 of the DV Act in view of the provisions of Section 26 thereof. It is argued that since the Family Court is already seized of the matrimonial dispute and the maintenance proceedings between the parties, there is no legal impediment in transferring the proceedings under the DV Act to the said court. In support of this contention, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Rohan Shah versus Nishigandha Shah, Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 477 of 2022, decided on 20.12.2023. It is submitted that in the said judgment, the Bombay High Court, after considering the provisions of the DV Act and the Family Courts Act, held that an application instituted under Section 12 of the DV Act before a Magistrate could be transferred to the Family Court. The Court also took into consideration the fact that the Family Court could grant the reliefs contemplated under Sections 18 to 22 of the DV Act and that transfer of the proceedings would avoid multiplicity of litigation and save the time and expense of the parties. It is, accordingly, contended that the present application deserves to be allowed on similar considerations.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has opposed the application and submitted that an independent application under Section 12 of the DV Act is maintainable before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, which is the forum specifically designated under the statute. It is contended that the mere fact that certain reliefs under the DV Act can also be sought before a Family Court in proceedings already pending there does not confer upon the Family Court the original jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate an independent application under Section 12 of the DV Act. Learned counsel has submitted that Section 26 of the DV Act has a limited scope and cannot be construed as conferring concurrent jurisdiction upon the Family Court to entertain an application under Section 12 of the Act. It is further argued that transfer of the proceedings would deprive the aggrieved person of the statutory procedure and appellate remedy provided under t