2026 Supreme(Online)(P&H) 145269
HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER – Appellant
Versus
DR. PUSHPA AND OTHERS – Respondent
LPA-3067-2026 (O&M)
##PAGE1##
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER …..APPELLANTS Vs.
DR. PUSHPA AND OTHERS …..RESPONDENTS Sr. No. Particular Details 1 The date when the judgment is reserved 27.10.2026 2 The date when the judgment is pronounced 16.11.2026 3 The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website 16.11.2026 Whether only operative part of the judgment is pronounced Full
4 or full judgment is pronounced The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full judgment, Not applicable
5 and reasons thereof CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUVIR SEHGAL HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH GAUR Argued by: Mr. Vipul Aggarwal, Senior Panel Counsel for the appellants-UOI *****
RAJESH GAUR, J.
1. Challenge in the present Letters Patent Appeal, filed under Clause X of the Letter patent is against the impugned order dated 19.05.2026 passed by learned Single Bench in CWP-13085 of 2026, whereby the writ petition filed by the contesting respondents No.1 and 2/ writ petitioners, seeking a direction to the appellants to permit respondent No.1 to avail herself of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) services, including In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), was allowed by the learned Single Bench in terms of the order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench in ‘Sarbjit Kaur and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Others’ [CWP-6818-2025].
##PAGE2##2. The brief facts of the case, as have emerged from the pleadings, are that respondents No. 1 and 2 are a married couple who approached respondent No.7 with the desire to conceive a child through IVF, particularly in view of the fact that, during their previous pregnancy, which was also facilitated through IVF, respondent No.1 had suffered the loss of one foetus. However, when the contesting respondents approached respondent No.7 to avail themselves of IVF services, they were informed that they were ineligible to undergo the procedure on account of the statutory age restrictions prescribed under Section 21(g)(i) of the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021 (for short, “ART Act”). The said provision stipulates that an ART clinic may provide ART services to a woman who is above the age of 21 years and below the age of 50 years, and since respondent No.1 had crossed the prescribed upper age limit, the couple was informed that they could no longer avail themselves of these services under the said Act.
3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid rejection, the contesting respondent approached this Court by way of a writ petition, which was allowed vide order dated 19.05.2026. Assailing the aforementioned order, the appellants have approached this Division Bench by way of the present Letters Patent Appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the learned Single Judge had overlooked the clear and unambiguous statutory age restrictions prescribed under Section 21(g)(i) of the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021. It is further contended that reliance placed upon the judgment in Sarbjit Kaur and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Other, CWP 6818-2025, was misplaced, as the Union of India, being a necessary party, was not impleaded in the said proceedings and, consequently, was not afforded an opportunity to defend the legislative intent underlying the relevant provision of the ART Act. It is further submitted that Section 21(g) of the ART Act contemplates that both constituents of the commissioning couple must simultaneously satisfy the prescribed eligibility criteria and that there is no provision under the Act which indicates that age eligibility requirement is to be satisfied by one of the constituents of the commissioning couple, to the exclusion of the other.
##PAGE3##5. We have perused the case file, the material available on record and the relevant provisions of the aforementioned Act, with the able assistance of learned counsel for the appellants.
6. During the course of arguments in the writ petition, learned counsel for the appellant-respondents submitted that the contesting res