SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

2024 Supreme(Online)(RAJ) 30428

HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN (JAIPUR BENCH)
MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN, J
HEMRAJ SON OF BIRDI CHAND – Appellant
Versus
STATE OF RAJASTHAN – Respondent
CRLMP / 5636 / 2021



Advocates:
Mr. Pankaj Joshi, Mr. Babulal Nasuna, PP, Mr. Banwari Lal Sharma, for complainant

The court emphasized that in Section 138 proceedings, the primary concern is compensation to the complainant, allowing for compromise even post-conviction.

Headnote:(A) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 482 - Quashing of conviction - Accused-petitioner sought to quash conviction under Section 138 after entering into a compromise with the complainant, who no longer wished to pursue the matter - The nature of the offence is quasi-criminal, primarily concerned with recovery of money - The court emphasized that the primary purpose of Section 138 is to ensure compensation to the complainant, allowing for compromise even post-conviction - The court relied on precedents to support the view that the compensatory aspect should be prioritized over punitive measures. (Paras 1-7)

(B) Compromise in criminal proceedings - The court recognized that parties are encouraged to settle disputes under Section 138, leading to closure of cases and unburdening the judicial system. (Paras 6-7)

Facts of the case:
The accused was convicted under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and sentenced to one year of simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs.90,000/-. After the conviction, the parties entered into a compromise, and the complainant expressed no objection to quashing the conviction.

Findings of Court:
The court found merit in the petitioner's submissions regarding the nature of the offence and the fact of compromise, leading to the conclusion that the conviction should be quashed.

Issues: The main issue was whether the compromise between the parties warranted the quashing of the conviction under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the primary concern in Section 138 proceedings is the recovery of money for the complainant, and that compromise is permissible, emphasizing the compensatory nature of the offence.

Result: Miscellaneous petition allowed; conviction quashed.

Order

25/01/2024

1. By way of this criminal misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C ., the accused-petitioner has approached this Court for quashing and setting aside the judgment dated 01.09.2011 passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge No.1 (Fast Track) Jaipur in Criminal Appeal No.60/2011 (70/04) whereby the learned lower appellate court has dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner and affirmed the judgment dated 01.07.2004 passed by learned Addl Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chaumu District Jaipur in Criminal Case No.414/2003 convicting the accused petitioner for offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and sentencing him to undergo one year SI with fine of Rs.90,000/-.

2. Learned counsel for the accused petitioner submits that after dismissal of the case before learned trial court as well as learned lower appellate court, the petitioner and the complainant have entered into compromise and both have settled their disputes and the complainant does not want to any action against the petitioner. He further submits that the nature of offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is quasi- criminal in nature, where, it, though, arise out of civil wrong, the law imposes criminal penalty in the form of imprisonment as well as the fine. In the prosecution under Section 138 N.I. Act, the complainant is primarily concerned with the recovery of the money and conviction of the accused serves very little purpose. In the instant case, from the material available on record, it is clear that the accused petitioner and the complainant have entered into compromise and the accused petitioner has satisfied the grievance. He thus prays that the instant misc. petition may be accepted and while setting aside both the judgment of learned courts below, the accused petitioner may be acquitted for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

3. Learned Public Prosecutor vehemently and fervently opposes the instant misc. petition.

4. Learned counsel for the complainant side does not dispute the factum of compromise and submits that he has no objection, if this misc. petition is accepted.

5. I have heard and considered the submissions advanced at bar and have gone through the material available on record. The factum of compromise arrived at between the parties is not in dispute and on the basis of compromise, the petitioner has prayed for setting aside of his conviction and sentence passed against him by the learned trial court and affirmed by the learned lower appellate court. I find substance in the submissions of the counsel for the petitioner that in the prosecution under Section 138 N.I. Act, the complainant is primarily concerned with the recovery of the money and conviction of the accused serves very little purpose, which in the instant case has been satisfied by the accused petitioner. I fortify my views from Supreme Court judgment in the case of M/s Gimpx Private Ltd. vs Manoj Goel reported in (2022) 11 SCC 705 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court observed and held as under:-

"27. The nature of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is quasi-criminal in that, while it arises out of a civil wrong, the law, however, imposes a criminal penalty in the form of imprisonment or fine. The purpose of the enactment is to provide security to creditors and instill confidence in the banking system of the country. The nature of the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act was considered by a three judge Bench decision of this Court in P Mohanraj and Others v. Shah (1999) 7 SCC 510 PART C Brothers Ispat Private Limited 21, where Justice RF Nariman, after adverting to the precedents of this Court, observed that:

"53. A perusal of the judgment in Ishwarlal Bhagwandas [S.A.L. Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas, MANU/SC/0160/1965 : (1966) 1 SCR 190 : AIR 1965 SC 1818] would show that a civil proceeding is not necessarily a proceeding which begins with the filing of a suit and culminates in execution of a decree. It would include a revenue proceeding as well as a w

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top