The court ruled that the absence of substantial evidence to classify land as forest overrides assumptions made by the Appellate Court, reinstating the trial Judge's injunction.

Order

Reserved On : 16.05.2025

Pronounced On : 20.05.2025

1. Heard the parties.

2. By order dated 9.11.2023 passed in Civil Misc. Case No. 265/2023, the Learned trial Judge allowed prayer of the petitioner for ad-interim injunction against respondent Forest - Department. The said order was challenged in Civil Appeal No. 41/2023 and by order dated 10.3.2025, the Appellate Court reversed the finding of the trial Judge and set aside order of ad-interim injunction.

3. The order of the Appellate Court is challenged herein.

4. The plaintiff-petitioner had brought the suit for permanent and mandatory injunction over the suit khasras fully referred in para 1 of the plaint situated in Village Dhinkali in the District of Udaipur. The case and claim of the plaintiff was/is that the plaintiff had purchased the suit property through registered sale deed dated 31.12.2021 from one Bheru Lal through holder of power of attorney of Bheru Lal, Mr. Chandra Prakash and Smt. Meena. How the vendor of the plaintiff got title over the suit property, which was agricultural land recorded in the name of vendor’s khatedar, is detailed in the sale deed. It is worth to notice that on 29.3.2008, Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur had re-acquired the suit property which was recorded in the name of Shankar Lal S/o Bheru Lal. Later on, by order dated 30.5.2023, the Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur granted permission to the petitioner to convert the suit property from agricultural to residential purpose in exercise of power under Section 90-A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 . Later on, the prayer of the petitioner for necessary permission to construct residential house was also allowed by the said authority.

5. The defendant by notice dated 2.5.2023 and subsequent notice dated 18.5.2023 had asked the petitioner to remove the encroachment over the forest land i.e. the suit khasras. The petitioner by his letter dated 30.5.2023 requested the defendant to supply a copy of the entire document on the basis whereof the defendant claims that the suit khasras are forest land.

6. While opposing the prayer for ad-interim injunction, the respondent had filed reply as well as written statement in the suit. In the written statement, the defendant asserted that in fact the suit khasras are part of the forest known as Segariya Forest area. The defendant asserted that the then Government of Mewar vide notification, issued in the year 1942, allotted certain land for forestation. A perusal of the notification reveals that there is neither any mention as to how much area was assigned for forestation nor there is any mention of khasra number, rather, the said land has been identified by boundaries as follows:-

(i) North : Thikami Khalsa

(ii) East : Debari Jaagir

(iii) South: Bedwas Jaagir

(iv) West: Thikami Khalsa-Bedwas Jaagir

Besides aforesaid, the defendant did not produce any documentary support that in fact the referred khasras were part of the forest. Rather, in the notice dated 18.5.2023, the defendant clearly mentioned that as per its official record, the suit properties were recorded in the khatedari of Shri Kuka, Kanna, Dola, Noja and others sons of Dhanna Bheel. The sale deed of the plaintiff also reveals that the aforesaid recorded persons transferred the suit property to some other persons and the vendor transferred it to the plaintiff.

7. Considering prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff, the learned trial Judge granted ad-interim injunction.

8. It appears that the Appellate Court assumed, contrary to the material on the record, that the suit khasras are part of the forest land and by making assumption, made certain observations that the land cannot be used for non forest purpose without permission of the Central Government as it would go against the objective of forestation. The Court accepted the claim of the defendant that the UIT had no authority to convert the land from agricultural to residential without hearing the defendant, as has been done in the case and acco