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2025 Supreme(Online)(Raj) 13189
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN (JODHPUR BENCH)
Farjand Ali, J
Girish Chandra Nath – Appellant
Versus
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. – Respondent
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1965/2011
For the Appellants/Petitioners: O.P. Mehta, V.D. Gaur, Zubin Ahmed
For the Respondents: Vinay Kothari, Mehul Kothari
Procedural technicalities must not override substantive justice in proceedings under beneficial legislation; the inadvertent closure of evidence by counsel should be rectified if the witness is material to the case and no prejudice is caused to the opposing party.
Headnote:The petitioners challenged an order of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal rejecting an application to produce additional evidence under the Motor Vehicles Act. The case arose from a fatal accident involving a truck and a scooter, resulting in the death of a son and permanent disability of a daughter. The petitioners' evidence was inadvertently closed by counsel, and a subsequent application to examine a sole eyewitness was dismissed by the Tribunal on technical grounds, including the non-disclosure of the witness's name. The primary issue was whether the Tribunal erred in adopting a hyper-technical approach by refusing to allow a material witness after the accidental closure of evidence. The court reasoned that procedural technicalities must yield to substantive justice, especially in beneficial legislation. It was observed that the closure was a bona fide misstatement by counsel and the eyewitness's testimony is indispensable to prove rash and negligent driving, particularly since the respondents' evidence had not yet commenced. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 09.12.2010 is hereby quashed and set aside.
| Table of Content |
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| 1. challenge against the rejection of application for additional evidence in a motor accident claim. (Para 1 , 2) |
| 2. conflict between the need for substantive justice versus procedural adherence and prevention of filling lacunae. (Para 3 , 4) |
| 3. primacy of substantive justice over technicalities in beneficial legislation to prevent miscarriage of justice. (Para 5) |
| 4. setting aside of the impugned order and permitting the examination of a material witness. (Para 6) |
Order
1. By way of the present Civil Writ Petition, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 09.12.2010 passed by the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No. 4-cum-Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jodhpur whereby their application seeking permission to produce additional evidence was rejected.
2. Briefly stated that facts giving rise the writ petition are that the petitioners instituted consolidated motor accident claim proceedings arising out of a tragic incident in which their son, Manhar Nath, died and their daughter, Garima Nath, suffered an above-knee amputation. The accident occurred near Ambaji Choraha when Truck No. RJ-19-G-4737, allegedly driven rashly and negligently, collided with their scooter. The driver fled the scene, and an eyewitness reportedly narrated the incident, leading to the lodging of an FIR at Police Station Abu Road.
2.1. During trial, the petitioners examined one witness, Girish Chandra, on 27.07.2010. On that date, due to an inadvertent statement made by learned counsel, the claimant’s evidence was recorded as closed. On the very next hearing, the petitioners moved an application seeking permission to examine the sole eyewitness, asserting that his testimony was indispensable to prove the occurrence of the accident. The learned Tribunal, however, dismissed the application by order dated 09.12.2010, hence, the present writ petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the impugned order is legally unsustainable and suffers from a patent error. It was submitted that the accidental closure of evidence was an inadvertent lapse by counsel, which was immediately sought to be rectified. The eyewitness is crucial as he witnessed the negligent driving of the offending truck and observed the driver flee the spot. In view of the respondents’ denial of the accident and the negative police report, such testimony becomes essential.
3.1. Counsel further submitted that the Tribunal adopted a hyper technical approach by emphasising non-disclosure of the witness’s name, though the application clearly clarified that the intended witness was the person who had actually witnessed the incident. Considering the irreparable harm suffered by the petitioners, the Tribunal’s order results in grave injustice. It was contended that in claims under the Motor Vehicles Act being a beneficial legislation procedural technicalities must yield to substantive justice, therefore, the instant writ petition may be allowed and petitioners be afforded opportunity of producing evidence.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents supported the impugned order and submitted that the petitioners had themselves expressly closed their evidence and therefore cannot be permitted to reopen it at a later stage. It was argued that allowing additional evidence after closure would prejudice the respondents and protract the proceedings unnecessarily.
4.1. Counsel contended that the application lacked bona fides, as the name and identity of the so-called eyewitness were not disclosed, casting doubt on the existence of such a witness. According to the respondents, the petitioners were attempting to fill lacunae in their case by introducing evidence belatedly.
4.2. It was further argued that the claimant’s own testimony had already been recorded and no justifiable explanation was furnished as to why such a vital witness was not produced earlier despite the alleged importance of his testimony. The respondents also rel
