The Labour Court is obligated to determine the 240-day continuous service requirement by examining the one-year period immediately preceding the termination date, regardless of whether this specific period is explicitly mentioned in the terms of reference.

Order

1. Mr. Sagar Jindal, Adv. appears and accepts notice on behalf of the respondent.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that feeling aggrieved by termination of services of the petitioner on 16.04.2010, the petitioner raised industrial dispute which was ultimately referred by appropriate Government for adjudication to the Labour Court, Kota (for short ‘the Labour Court’). Terms of reference are being reproduced as under:-

“D;k izkFkhZ Jh r:.k lksuh iq= Jh y{ehukjk;.k lksuh] nSfud osru Hkksxh deZpkjh fuoklh x.ks”k rkykc] dksVk us vizkFkhZ lgk;d vfHk;ark] t;iqj fo|qr forj.k fuxe fy- ¼,pVh,e& ½ foKku T uxj] dksVk ds v/khu fdlh ,d dSys.Mj o’kZ esa 240 fnu fujUrj dk;Z fd;k gS\ ;fn gka] rks D;k izkFkhZ Jfed dks vizkFkhZ }kjk fnukad 16-04-2010 ls lsok ls i`Fkd djuk mfpr ,oa oS/k gS\ ;fn ugha] rks Jfed fdl jkgr o jkf”k dks izkIr djus dk vf/kdkj gS\

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that learned Labour Court has decided the reference vide award dated 14.10.2025 without proper application of mind and by not exercising the jurisdiction otherwise vested in it. Learned counsel submits that learned Labour Court refrained from giving answer to the reference by recording a finding that in the reference, it has not been specified from which date, 240 days are to be counted as well as the date of termination is also not specific in the terms of the reference.

4. Learned counsel submits that such findings are totally against the provisions of Section 25B and 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and date of termination is apparently specific in the terms of the reference.

5. Learned counsel for the respondent although, defended the award, yet he is not a position to justify the findings given by Labour Court.

6. It is a settled proposition of law that for the purpose of counting 240 days, the Labour Court is under an obligation to take into consideration period of one year immediately preceding the date of termination and such period is not required to be specified in the terms of reference. In addition to above, bare perusal of the terms of reference would also reveal that date of termination i.e. 16.04.2010 has been specified in the terms of reference itself.

7. Thus, it is clear that the Labour Court has utterly failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it and has refrained from giving answer to the reference for totally unjustified and irrational reasons.

8. In view of above, the award dated 14.10.2025 passed by the Labour Court, being apparently perverse, is hereby set aside with the directions to the Labour Court to answer the reference on merits after examining the evidence on record and in the light of provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

9. The writ petition filed by the petitioner stands disposed of.

10. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.