[2025:RJ-JP:50838-DB]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.4105/2025

1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through The Collector, Alwar

2. The Superintending Engineer, PWD, Circle-Alwar 3. The Executive Engineer, PWD, Division, Rajgarh ----Appellants Versus M/s Braham Prakash Modi, A Partnership Firm Situated At 74 Sudarshanpura Industrial Area, 22 Godown, Jaipur ----Respondent For Appellant(s) : Mr.Vigyan Shah, AAG with Mr.Rohit Tiwari, AAAG, Mr.Sankalp Vijay, AAAG, Mr.Priyam Agarwal, Adv. &

Mr.Deepak Mittal, Adv.

For Respondent(s) :

HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SANGEETA SHARMA

Judgment

16/12/2025

1. The order dated 07.04.2025 is under challenge before this Court, whereby, the objections raised under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter ‘the Act of 1996’) were rejected and the application for condonation of delay was also dismissed.

2. The present appeal is also time barred by eighty days.

3. Taking into consideration the settled law relating to the time limitations provided under the provisions of specific acts while the Act of 1996 Section 34 which allows the objection to be raised in ninety days, also allows condonation of delay upto thirty days alone, the present appeal is found to be misconceived in view of the judgment passed in the case of Union of India Vs. Popular Constructions Co. reported in [(2001)8 SCC 470] and State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. Vs. Himachal Techno Engineers & Anr. reported in [(2010)12 SCC 210]. The Supreme Court in the case of Popular Constructions Co. (supra) has held as under:-

“11. Thus, where the legislature prescribed a special limitation for the purpose of the appeal and the period of limitation of 60 days was to be computed after taking the aid of Sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, the specific inclusion of these Sections meant that to that extent only the provisions of the Limitation Act stood extended and the applicability of the other provisions, by necessary implication stood excluded.

12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are 'but not thereafter' used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of section 5 of that Act.

Parliament did not need to go further.

To hold that the Court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.

13. Apart from the language, “express exclusion” may follow from the scheme and object of the special or local law:

“Even in a case, where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extend the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation".

14. Here the history and scheme of the 1996 Act support the conclusion that the time- limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an award is absolute and unextendable by Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of its main objectives the need "to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process". This objective has found expression in Section 5 of the Act which prescribes the extent of judicial intervention in no uncertain terms:

"5. Extent of judicial intervention. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part."”

4. Following the earlier law, the Supreme Court has laid down th