HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18133/2025 Kamlesh Kumar Meena S/o Harful Meena ----Petitioner Versus State Of Rajasthan ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Vikash Meena with Mr. Ravi Kumar Palsaniya For Respondent(s) :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUROOP SINGHI

Order

26/11/2025 Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the order dated 13.11.2025 whereby instead of the petitioner, who was the then Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Beegota, Panchayat Samiti Rajgarh, District Alwar, the Deputy Sarpanch has been appointed as the Administrator on the completion of the tenure of the Panchayat. The said impugned order specifically records that the petitioner has not been appointed as Administrator on the ground that he remained in judicial custody for some period and thus, a decision has been taken to appoint Deputy Sarpanch as the Administrator.

Learned counsel has made specific submission by referring to the provisions of Section 38(4) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1994) which provides for the powers of State Government regarding removal and suspension. Learned counsel has further referred to the provisions of Section 95(1)(b) of the Act of 1994 which deals with the consequences of dissolution of any panchayati raj institution. Further reference has been made to the circular dated 16.01.2025 issued by the respondent-State Government read with the departmental order dated 11.02.2025 as per which, the petitioner being a Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, whose tenure has completed, should have been appointed as the Administrator. Learned counsel further relied upon judgment dated 27.07.2015 passed by this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.7307/2015 Smt. Bebi versus State of Rajasthan, wherein by referring to the provisions of Section 38(4) of the Act of 1994, it was held that it is only upon the framing of charges that it can be said that a trial is pending against the person. The petitioner submits that in the present case, no charge-sheet has been filed against the petitioner in pursuance to FIR No.110/2025 dated 11.05.2025 registered at Police Station Baswa, District Dausa, wherein he was arrested and subsequently, enlarged on bail vide order dated 17.10.2025. Learned counsel further submits that in pursuance to the Circular dated 16.01.2025 read with the departmental order dated 11.02.2025, he had a legitimate expectation for being appointed as the Administrator, in support of which he has relied upon judgment dated 26.07.2012 pronounced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., (2012) 11 SCC 1, relevant paragraph number 188 of which reads as under:-

“188. It is not necessary to multiply the decisions of this Court. Suffice it to observe that the following principles in relation to the doctrine of legitimate expectation are now well established:

188.1. The doctrine of legitimate expectation can be invoked as a substantive and enforceable right.

188.2. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is founded on the principle of reasonableness and fairness. The doctrine arises out of principles of natural justice and there are parallels between the doctrine of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel.

188.3. Where the decision of an authority is founded in public interest as per executive policy or law, the court would be reluctant to interfere with such decision by invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The legitimate expectation doctrine cannot be invoked to fetter changes in administrative policy if it is in the public interest to do so.

188.4. The legitimate expectation is different from anticipation and an anticipation cannot amount to an assertable expectation. Such expectation should be justifiable, legitimate and protectable.

188.5. The protection of legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an