HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR S.B. Criminal Misc. Suspension of Sentence Application No.318/2026 In S.B. Criminal Appeal (Sb) No. 349/2026 Shyamlal S/o Hukmaram, Aged About 35 Years, Kanwa Ki Dhani, Bhawad, Police Station Mathania, Jodhpur, (Presently Lodged In Central Jail Jodhpur Since 06.02.2026)

----Appellant Versus State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp ----Respondent For Appellant(s) : Mr. Jayram Saran Mr. DK Bishnoi For Respondent(s) : Mr. NS Chandawat, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI

Order

17/02/2026

1. The instant application for suspension of sentence has been moved on behalf of the applicant in the matter of judgment dated 06.02.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge NDPS Act No.1, Jodhpur Metropolitan, Jodhpur in Sessions Case No.25/2015 whereby he was convicted and sentenced to suffer two years' RI along with a fine of Rs.20,000/- under Section 8/21 of NDPS Act.

2. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned trial Judge has not appreciated the correct, legal and factual aspects of the matter and thus, reached at an erroneous conclusion of guilt, therefore, the same is required to be appreciated again by this court being the first appellate Court. Hearing of the appeal is likely to take long time, therefore, the application for suspension of sentence may be granted.

3. Per contra, learned public prosecutor has vehemently opposed the prayer made by learned counsel for the accused-applicant for releasing the appellant on application for suspension of sentence.

4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

5. There exists a fine yet significant distinction between the grant of bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the suspension of sentence under Section 389 CrPC. While the power exercised under Section 439 CrPC is essentially discretionary in nature and operates at the pre-conviction stage, the jurisdiction under Section 389 CrPC, though also discretionary, is qualitatively different and operates post-conviction. Under Section 389 CrPC, the appellate court is vested with a distinct authority; however, the core consideration before the appellate forum must necessarily be whether the judgment of conviction and the consequent order of sentence are sustainable in the eyes of law.

6. It is trite that the presumption of innocence, which enures in favour of an accused, comes to an end upon conviction. Consequently, while considering an application under Section 389 CrPC, the appellate court is required to examine the grounds raised in the appeal, and for such purpose, the oral and documentary evidence must be looked into. Where, upon appreciation of evidence, it appears that the conclusions drawn by the trial court may be erroneous, and where logical, legal and sustainable arguments are advanced assailing the findings, disclosing a strong and arguable case, the appellate court is duty-bound to consider such contentions.

7. Where the sustainability of the conviction itself becomes debatable, and where the grounds raised in appeal, if adjudicated in favour of the appellant, disclose a real and substantial possibility of success, and where, prima facie, it appears that the conviction may be reversed and the appellant may be acquitted, the appellate court ought to suspend the sentence pending disposal of the appeal.

8. Such discretion deserves to be exercised with greater circumspection in cases where the appellate forum has sufficient reason to believe that the appeal is not likely to be taken up for hearing in the near future. In such circumstances, the court is required to assess whether the grounds raised are not merely ornamental but possess real substance and force, for the simple reason that if the appeal ultimately succeeds, the period of incarceration already undergone cannot be undone or restituted. In such a situation, the court should incline towards suspending the sentence.

9. At the same time, it is well se