Order

1. By way of the present criminal writ petition, the petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, assailing the legality and propriety of the order dated 19.03.2025 passed by the Director General, Prisons, Rajasthan, Jaipur, whereby the petitioner’s application seeking transfer to an Open Air Camp was rejected.

2. The factual backdrop reveals that the petitioner was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment by the learned Sessions Judge, Balotra in Sessions Case No.31/1992. The conviction and sentence imposed upon the petitioner came to be affirmed by this Court in D.B.Criminal Appeal No.54/1995 decided on 08.10.2024. As per the material placed on record, the petitioner has already undergone more than eight years of incarceration.

3. With the passage of time and in view of the period already spent in custody, the petitioner submitted an application before the competent authority seeking transfer to an Open Air Camp in accordance with the applicable prison regulations and policy governing such placements. The said application, however, came to be rejected by the Director General, Prisons, Rajasthan, Jaipur vide order dated 19.03.2025 on the ground that the offence for which the petitioner stands convicted falls within the category of “prohibited offences” and, therefore, his case was not considered eligible for placement in an Open Air Camp.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the rejection of the petitioner’s application is founded upon a misconstruction of the governing provisions. It is urged that the authorities have proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the offence falling within the category of “prohibited offences” operates as an absolute and inflexible bar against consideration of a prisoner for transfer to an Open Air Camp. According to the petitioner, such an interpretation defeats the true purport and intent of the relevant provisions.

5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the material available on record.

6. Upon scrutiny of the governing policy and the language employed therein, it becomes evident that the expression “ordinarily” has been consciously incorporated while referring to prisoners convicted for certain categories of offences. The word “ordinarily”, by its very semantic import, denotes a general rule or usual practice rather than an absolute prohibition. In legal parlance, the expression is employed to signify a rule of guidance which admits of exceptions depending upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of a given case.

6.1. The term “ordinarily” cannot be construed as creating an irrevocable or permanent disqualification. Rather, it contemplates that while prisoners convicted for certain offences may not generally be considered for placement in Open Air Camps, the competent authority is not divested of its discretion to examine individual cases where the surrounding circumstances justify a departure from the general rule. Thus, the presence of the word “ordinarily” unmistakably indicates that the provision does not impose a complete or inflexible embargo but merely prescribes a guiding norm which must yield to exceptional circumstances warranting a more liberal consideration.

6.2. The philosophy underlying the establishment of Open Air Camps is rooted in the reformative and rehabilitative approach of modern penology. Such institutions are designed to facilitate gradual reintegration of prisoners into the social mainstream by fostering responsibility, discipline and constructive engagement. To construe the provision relating to “prohibited offences” as imposing a blanket and perpetual bar would not only run contrary to the textual scheme but would also undermine the reformative objectives embedded in the penal administration system.

6.3. A perusa