2025 Supreme(Online)(Raj) 18838
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR
Anand Sharma, J
Harbajan Singh – Appellant
Versus
Superintendent of Police, District Ajmer, Ajmer – Respondent
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7146/2003
Important Points
Subject
Service Law - Suspension and Regularization
Act Referred
Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958: R.13, R.16
Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951: R.54
Headnote
(B) No Work No Pay - Principle not absolute - Where an employee is deprived of liberty due to custodial detention and is subsequently acquitted, applying the rigid 'no work no pay' rule is inequitable and unjustified, particularly when the absence from duty was not voluntary. (Paras 9, 14)
Facts of the case:
The petitioner, a Constable, was arrested and remained in judicial custody from 21.08.2000 to 01.08.2002, during which time he was placed under suspension. Following his acquittal by the criminal court and subsequent exoneration in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority passed an order stating that the suspension period (21.08.2000 to 11.09.2002) should be counted for all purposes and the petitioner was entitled to all pay and allowances. However, the same order paradoxically treated the period of judicial custody as a period of absence and regularized it as leave without pay.
Findings of Court:
The court found the order self-contradictory and arbitrary, noting that the petitioner's absence was not voluntary but occasioned by custodial detention. The court held that an employee who is physically deprived of liberty and later acquitted should not be saddled with financial prejudice.
Issues: Whether the Disciplinary Authority could treat the period of judicial custody as leave without pay after expressly directing the regularization of the entire suspension period for all purposes.
Ratio Decidendi: Equity demands that an employee acquitted of criminal charges and exonerated departmentally should not suffer financial loss for a period of detention beyond their control. A Disciplinary Authority cannot award a benefit in one part of an operative order and withdraw it in the next without reasoned justification, as such internal inconsistency is fatal to the order.
Result: Writ petition allowed.
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Sunil Samdaria
For the Respondents: Vinod Kumar Gupta
1. The matter at hand is one of uncommon factual contour and legal complexity. It revolves around a set of circumstances, both peculiar and legally significant.
2. The present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assails the penultimate part of the operative paragraph of order dated 10.10.2003 (Annexure-3) passed by the Disciplinary Authority, to the extent that the period during which the petitioner remained in judicial custody from 21.8.2000 to 01.08.2002 shall be treated as period of absence and shall be regularised as leave without pay. The petitioner has sought indulgence of this court with following prayer:
"In Conspectus of above state of fact it is prayed to Hon'ble Court-
i) To issue an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned part i.e.
"निलम्बन अवधि में यह कानि. 21.8.2000 से दिनांक 1.8.2002 तक अवधि में रहा इस अवधि को मुख्यालय से गैर हाजिर मानते हुए इस अवधि का अवैतनिक अवकाश स्वीकृत किया जाता है।"
of the order dated 10.10.2003 (Exhibit-3)
ii) To issue an appropriate writ/order/direction directing the respondents to grant all consequential reliefs consequent to quashing of impugned part.
iii) Any other relief which this Court deem fit and proper in facts and circumstances of the case may also be awarded.
iv) Award cost of the writ petition."
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was holding post of Constable in the Police Department. He was arrested on 21.8.2000 and sent in judicial custody pursuant to one FIR lodged for committing alleged offences punishable under Sections 306 and 376 IPC and Sections 3(1)(12) and 3(2)(5) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Consequent upon his arrest, he was also suspended on 21.08.2000 by the competent authority in exercise of Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Rules of 1958') and departmental enquiry was also initiated against him vide charge sheet dated 16.04.2001. After undergoing a full-fledged trial, the petitioner was acquitted by the competent criminal court vide judgment dated 01.08.2002. After acquittal, his suspension from the post of Constable was also revoked on 11.09.2002. Petitioner underwent enquiry in accordance with the provisions of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 and vide order dated 10.10.2003, the Disciplinary Authority exonerated the petitioner of all departmental charges and in the penultimate part of the operative paragraph held that he was entitled to all pay and allowances for the period of suspension (21.08.2000 to 11.09.2002) and that the suspension period shall be counted for all purposes in government service. Notwithstanding that clear direction, the penultimate part of the same operative paragraph treats the period 21.08.2000 to 01.08.2002 (the period of judicial custody) as period of absence and converts it into leave without pay. As per the petitioner, it is this manifestly inconsistent and punitive limb of order dated 10.10.2003, which is causing miscarriage of justice and grave prejudice to him. The petitioner challenges only the latter limb of the aforesaid order which denies pay for the period when he was in judicial custody.
4. Learned Additional Government Counsel appearing for the Respondents, in order to defend the impugned action, submits that the general principle of no work, no pay is a settled norm, that an employee who does not perform duty is not automatically entitled to salary for the period of non-attendance. As per respondents, the period when the petitioner was in judicial custody was a period of non-attendance and thus could legitimately be treated as absence. The Disciplinary Authority had already exercised its discretion in reasonable manner. While the Authority found fit to exonerate the petitioner and to count the suspension period for all other service benefits, it also took the view that the period of judicia