In an appeal against acquittal for rash and negligent driving, the appellate court should not interfere unless the trial court's finding is perverse, as high speed alone does not prove criminal negligence without evidence of recklessness as the proximate cause of the accident.

Judgment

1. The present criminal appeal was initially instituted as an application seeking leave to appeal under Section 378(iii) Cr.P.C. against the judgment of acquittal. Since leave to appeal had already been granted at an earlier stage, the matter thereafter stood registered as a regular appeal and now survives for final adjudication under Section 378(1) Cr.P.C. The appellant-State has assailed the order and judgment dated 22.08.1997 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) & Judicial Magistrate No.3, Jodhpur in Criminal Case No.333/1993 (State Vs. Jagdish), whereby the accused- respondent Jagdish was acquitted of the offences under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC and Section 134 /187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 .

2. The prosecution case, in succinct compass, is that on 04.01.1993, complainant Moti Ram, then posted as a police constable, submitted a written report alleging that while he along with another constable Nanak Ram was on patrol duty, they reached near Viruchak at about 7:30 a.m. At that time, a city bus bearing registration No.RRN-8107 allegedly came from the side of M.G. Hospital at high speed and in a rash and negligent manner, whereafter it collided with a Rajdoot motorcycle proceeding from the opposite direction towards Sojati Gate. It was alleged that the impact was severe, resulting in the motorcyclist being thrown and sustaining grievous injuries on the head, chest and limbs. The injured was immediately sent to the hospital. The driver of the bus was apprehended at the spot and disclosed his name as Jagdish son of Ummed Singh, resident of Mandore, Jodhpur. On the basis of the said report, formal FIR came to be registered and investigation commenced.

2.1. Upon completion of investigation, challan was filed against the accused-respondent for offences under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC and Section 134 /187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 . The learned trial Court framed notice/charge, which the accused denied and claimed trial.

2.2. In support of its case, the prosecution examined as many as eleven witnesses including alleged eyewitnesses, police personnel, mechanical and medical witnesses, and also exhibited documentary material such as site plan, seizure memos, arrest memo, inquest papers, postmortem report, statements recorded during investigation and other connected documents. The accused, in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., denied the allegations and pleaded innocence.

2.3. After conclusion of trial and appreciation of the entire evidence, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused by holding that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accident occurred on account of rashness or negligence attributable to the accused. Hence the instant appeal.

3. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant- State contended that the learned trial Court erred in law and on facts in discarding cogent ocular evidence of prosecution witnesses. It was argued that the testimony of eyewitnesses clearly established that the city bus was being driven at excessive speed and in a negligent manner, resulting in fatal collision with the motorcycle. It was thus urged that the acquittal deserves to be set aside and the accused be convicted in accordance with law.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant State, no one appears for the respondent to prosecute the case and I have carefully examined the record as well as the reasoning assigned by the learned trial Court.

6. It is trite law that in an appeal against acquittal, though the appellate Court possesses power to re-appreciate the evidence, interference is justified only where the conclusions of the trial Court are manifestly perverse, unreasonable, or wholly contrary to the material on record. The presumption of innocence available to the accused stands fortified by an order of acquittal. If the view taken by the trial Court is a possible and plausible one, the same