Judgment

1. The present matter was initially instituted as an application seeking leave to appeal by the State against the judgment of acquittal rendered in favour of the accused-respondent. Leave to appeal having been granted at an earlier stage, the proceedings thereafter stood converted into a regular criminal appeal and have now come up for final adjudication on merits.

2. By way of the instant appeal, the State has assailed the legality and correctness of the judgment dated 03.03.2000 delivered by the learned Sessions Judge, Anti Corruption Act Bikaner in Sessions case No.32/96 (149/97), whereby accused-respondent Ramzan Khan, then posted as Junior Clerk / Supply Clerk in the Tehsil Office, Bhadra, came to be acquitted of the offences punishable under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

3. The prosecution case, in brief, was that complainant Lalchand, a kerosene dealer, approached the Anti-Corruption Bureau alleging that the respondent had demanded illegal gratification for renewal of his licence. Acting upon the complaint, verification proceedings were allegedly undertaken, followed by a trap operation in which an amount of Rs.600/- was recovered from the respondent. After investigation and sanction for prosecution, charge-sheet came to be filed.

3.1. The learned trial Court, upon full-fledged trial, recording the statements of prosecution witnesses, considering the defence evidence and evaluating documentary material, returned a finding that the prosecution had failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the essential ingredients of demand and conscious acceptance of illegal gratification, and consequently acquitted the respondent. Hence the instant appeal.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully perused the entire record of the case, including the impugned judgment.

5. At the very threshold, it deserves notice that the present appeal arises out of an order of acquittal. The settled canon of criminal jurisprudence ordains that once an accused has secured an acquittal, the presumption of innocence stands further reinforced. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are perverse, manifestly illegal, grossly unreasonable, or founded upon misreading of material evidence, appellate interference is neither warranted nor desirable.

6. Having bestowed anxious consideration to the material available on record, this Court finds that the learned trial Judge has undertaken a meticulous, threadbare and judicious appraisal of the evidence and has recorded conclusions resting on sound legal foundation.

6.1. It is trite that in prosecutions under the Prevention of Corruption Act, mere recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to bring home guilt unless the foundational fact of demand of illegal gratification is proved by cogent and trustworthy evidence.

6.2. In the case at hand, the allegation of demand substantially rested upon the solitary testimony of complainant Lalchand. No independent witness has supported the assertion that the accused demanded bribe. The trap witnesses themselves did not depose regarding any demand made in their presence. The prosecution also failed to produce any unimpeachable corroborative circumstance lending assurance to the complainant’s version. This Court is of the opinion that the learned trial Court, therefore, rightly scrutinised the testimony of the complainant with due caution.

6.3. The record reveals that the complainant was subjected to extensive cross-examination wherein several prior irregularities, departmental proceedings, penalties and disputes concerning his dealership surfaced. Material was brought on record indicating that complaints and regulatory action had earlier been processed against him through the concerned office where the accused was functioning. Thus, the possibility of prior animus or institutional resentment could not be light