The court held that limitation begins from the date of knowledge if an order is passed without notice, and substantive rights of appeal should not be defeated by technical defaults or inadvertent omissions of the counsel.

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI

Order

12/05/2026

1. An application (IA No.01/2024) for condonation of delay

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been moved at the

behest of the appellants, it is submitted that the impugned order

was passed behind the back of the appellants, without their

knowledge or opportunity of hearing, and consequently, they were

unaware of the passing of the said order.

2. The law of limitation is essentially a rule of discipline, which

mandates that an aggrieved party must challenge an order within

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the time prescribed by law. However, this principle operates only

in cases where the party had actual or constructive knowledge of

the order. Where an order is passed against a person without

notice or audience, the limitation would commence only from the

date on which such person acquires knowledge of the order. Once

it is demonstrated that the appellants approached the Court with

reasonable promptitude upon gaining knowledge of the impugned

order, the length of delay pales into insignificance. Justice cannot

be allowed to be thwarted on technicalities when sufficient cause

is shown.

3. In this view of the matter, the delay occasioned in filing the

present restoration application stands satisfactorily explained.

4. Accordingly, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation

Act is allowed, and the delay of 155 days in filing the instant

restoration application is condoned.

5. The instant restoration application has been preferred

seeking restoration of the revision petition bearing S.B. Civil First

Appeal No.289/2021.

6. The appeal filed by the appellant has been dismissed by the

Registry in pursuance of the direction passed by the co-ordinate

Bench of this Court on 22.03.2024 on that day none appeared on

behalf of the appellant and whereby the counsel was obligated to

to remove the defects within a period of two weeks. Since counsel

for the appellant could not attend the Court and some change of

administrative setup was going on in the office of government

counsel, due to which the order did not come in knowledge,

therefore, needful could not be done within the stipulated period

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and thus, the office vide its proceeding dated 22.05.2024

dismissed the appeal.

7. I have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

petitioner and have perused the material available on record.

7.1. Upon due consideration, this Court is of the firm view that a

lis instituted by a litigant ought to be adjudicated on its intrinsic

merits rather than being non-suited on account of trivial or

technical infractions, particularly where such lapses stem from

inadvertence or omission on the part of counsel in complying with

procedural directions. The administration of justice cannot be

permitted to founder upon hyper-technicalities, nor can a party be

made to suffer irreversible prejudice for the inadvertent default or

procedural abdication of his legal representative.

7.2. An appeal assailing such findings cannot be dismissed in

limine merely because the advocate could not remove the defect

within stipulated time. Such a procedural irregularity, attributable

to counsel, does not ipso facto efface or annihilate the substantive

and statutory right of appeal vested in the accused.

Furthermore, any order resulting in dismissal under such

circumstances must be a reasoned and speaking order, evincing

conscious and judicious application of mind to the factual and legal

substratum of the case. It must delin