Territorial jurisdiction is governed by the location where the cause of action arises, not by the convenience of the litigant or the seat of an appellate authority. Initiating litigation in a forum outside the territorial ambit of the dispute constitutes forum shopping and an abuse of process warranting punitive costs.

Order

1. Applications (I.A No.1/25 and I.A No.3/25) for impleadment as party respondent stand already decided.

2. Applications (I.A No.02/2025 and I.A No.04/25) for recalling of order dated 01.09.2025 moved by the Associations who have not been impleaded as party. Since the application for impleadment itself is rejected, the applications for recalling moved by such applicants also stand rejected.

3. The matter comes up on the issue framed by this Court regarding the jurisdiction of Bench and the jurisdiction of the Principal seat. In the case of Shri Ram Rakh Vyas Vs. Union of India 1977 RLW 65 this Court held as under:

“31. With respect, we are unable to accept the construction placed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court on the words 'arising in the districts of.' The words 'arising in' must, in the context, mean 'pertaining to the districts of' or 'arising from'. Any other meaning given to these words would result in a construction reductio absurdum. If a provision in a remedial statute is reasonably capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which furthers the policy of the Act and is more beneficial to those in whose interest the Act may have been passed, and the doubt, if any, should be resolved in their favour.

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33. It is wrong to attribute to the proviso of the Presidential Order a meaning which is not intended. The proviso carves out an exception from the main enacting part. It declares that notwithstanding the establishment of a permanent Bench at Jaipur, the Chief Justice shall have the power to direct that any case or class of cases arising in any of the districts falling within the jurisdiction of the Jaipur Bench, shall be heard at the main seat at Jodhpur. The proviso, therefore, reaffirms the pre-existing power of the Chief Justice for distribution of the business of the High Court under sec. 44(2) of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 , which reads:

"44(2) The Chief Justice shall be responsible for the distribution and conduct of the business of the High Court, and shall determine which Judge in each case will sit alone and which Judges of the Court will constitute a Bench."

The Chief Justice is the master of the roster. He has full power, authority and jurisdiction in the matter of allocation of business of the High Court. This is a power which flows not only from the provision contained in sec. 44(2) but inheres in the nature of things. In Niranjan Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (18), the Full Bench has affirmed such powers in the Chief Justice, flowing from Rules 54 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952.

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35. We must, however, observe that the learned Single Judge was not right in holding that cases 'instituted' at the Jaipur Bench after 31-1-1977 shall be 'heard' only at the Jaipur Bench. This is contrary to the proviso to the Presidential Order. The learned Single Judge appears to have, in reaching that conclusion, followed the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (19). Their Lordships' decision in Nasiruddin's case, supra is clearly distinguishable. There, their Lordships were concerned with amalgamation of two High Courts. After the amalgamation, the two High Court ceased to exist and became Benches of the newly constituted High Court In those circumstances, their Lordships held that a case 'instituted' at a particular Bench had to be 'heard' at that Bench. Here, there is creation of a permanent Bench by a Presidential Order issued under sec. 51(2). The matter falls to be determined by the terms of the Presidential Order which by the proviso enables the withdrawal of a case or class of cases from the permanent Bench at Jaipur to the main seat at Jodhpur.

36. With respect to the other orders, issued by the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice, their validity is beyond question. No doubt, the Presidential Order comes into force on 31-1-1977 as provided for by sub-clause (2) of clause (1). Clause(2) provides