1. Writ petition challenging termination of compassionate appointment due to alleged suppression of conviction under Rajasthan Excise Act. (Para 1 , 2 )
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2026 Supreme(Online)(Raj) 20319
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN (JAIPUR BENCH)
ANAND SHARMA
VIKRAM SINGH – Appellant
Versus
STATE OF RAJ AND ORS – Respondent
CW / 1607 / 2017
Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Saurabh Purohit, Rakesh Kumar
For the Respondents: Priya Rastogi, Ankur Rastogi
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Saurabh Purohit, Rakesh Kumar
For the Respondents: Priya Rastogi, Ankur Rastogi
Non-disclosure of a conviction followed by a probation order under the Probation of Offenders Act does not constitute material suppression if statutory protection removes the disqualification, especially when the candidate was a minor at the time of the offense and application.
Headnote:(A) Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 - Sections 4 and 12 - Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950 - Sections 19 and 54 - Termination of services of probationer trainee - Suppression of criminal antecedents - Effect of grant of probation - Section 12 provides that a person dealt with under Section 4 shall not suffer disqualification attaching to a conviction of an offence - If disclosure of a fact would not have resulted in denial of benefit by operation of law, non-disclosure cannot be treated as material suppression or fraud justifying termination (Paras 15 and 16).
(B) Principles of Natural Justice - Right to an effective hearing - Notice for personal hearing must not be vague - Individual must be specifically informed of the precise allegation regarding suppression to provide a meaningful explanation - Opportunity of hearing must be real and effective, not a mere formality (Para 14).
(C) Service Law - Character and Antecedents - Assessment of suitability cannot be mechanical - Employer must consider the nature of the offence, the post in question, the applicable rules, and the age and circumstances of the employee at the relevant time (Paras 17 and 22).
Facts of the case:
A petitioner was appointed as a probationer trainee on compassionate grounds. The appointment order contained a condition allowing termination if character and antecedents were found unsatisfactory. The petitioner failed to disclose a prior conviction under the Excise Act in the application affidavit. However, the petitioner was a minor at the time of the registration of the FIR, the conviction, and the submission of the appointment application. The criminal court had released the petitioner on probation under the relevant law. The employer terminated the services on the ground of suppression of facts after providing a personal hearing.
Findings of Court:
The termination order is invalid as it violates the principles of natural justice due to a vague notice for the personal hearing. Furthermore, under the statutory protection of the Probation of Offenders Act, the conviction did not create a legal disqualification for employment. Since the disclosure of the conviction would not have legally disentitled the petitioner from the appointment, the non-disclosure does not constitute material suppression. The petitioner's status as a minor at all material stages further mitigates the allegation of deliberate concealment.
Issues: Whether the non-disclosure of a conviction followed by a probation order, where the individual was a minor, constitutes material suppression justifying termination, and whether the procedure for termination complied with the principles of natural justice.
Ratio Decidendi: Non-disclosure of a fact that does not result in a legal disqualification under statutory law (such as Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act) cannot be treated as material suppression. Termination based on such non-disclosure, especially when the employee was a minor and the process of hearing was vague, is disproportionate and legally unsustainable.
Result: Writ petition allowed. Impugned termination order quashed and set aside. Respondents directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith with continuity of service and notional benefits for the intervening period.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- administrative law
- crime and sentencing
-
practice and procedure
- writ jurisdiction (Para 1)
Table of Contents
2. Petitioner: conviction during minority with probation bars disqualification under Section 12 of Probation of Offenders Act. Respondent: deliberate suppression of material fact justifies termination. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 )
3. Petitioner was minor at all material times; conviction with probation under Section 4, Probation of Offenders Act does not create disqualification under Section 12; suppression not material. (Para 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 )
4. Conviction followed by probation under Section 4, Probation of Offenders Act does not operate as disqualification under Section 12; non-disclosure of such conviction is not material suppression warranting termination. (Para 15 , 16 , 22 )
5. Termination order quashed; directed reinstatement with continuity of service and notional benefits. (Para 26 )
6. Does conviction with probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act create a disqualification for service under Section 12?
No, Section 12 provides that a person dealt with under Sections 3 or 4 shall not suffer any disqualification attaching to a conviction under any law. (Para 15 , 16 )
7. Can non-disclosure of a conviction that carries no legal disqualification be treated as material suppression warranting termination?
No, suppression is material only if the suppressed fact could legally affect entitlement; where disclosure could not result in denial, termination on that ground is unsustainable. (Para 16 , 22 , 23 )
8. What factors must an employer consider before terminating for suppression of criminal antecedents?
Nature of offence, age at relevant time, outcome of criminal case, nature of post, applicable rules, and whether the antecedent bears rational bearing on suitability. (Para 17 , 22 )
9. Is a minor capable of understanding the legal distinction between a conviction and a conviction with probation for purposes of disclosure?
The court may consider that a minor may not possess the requisite understanding and the declaration cannot be examined in isolation from the petitioner's age. (Para 13 )
Judgment
REPORTABLE
1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing the order dated 20.01.2016 issued by the Secretary (Administration), Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited whereby services of the petitioner have been terminated in view of Condition No.10 mentioned in the appointment order.
2. Facts in brief are that father of the petitioner was employee of respondent-AVVNL, however, he died while in service on 18.06.2014. After his death, the petitioner applied for compassionate appointment in place of his deceased father and accordingly appointment order was issued on 20.02.2015 for appointing the petitioner on the post of 'Helper-II' as probationer trainee. Condition No.10 of appointment order dated 20.02.2015 is reproduced hereunder:
“10. प्रोबेशन ट्रेनी की सेवाईें किसी भी समय एक माह की लिखित सूचना अथवा उसके बदले में एक माह का वेतन देकर समाप्त की जा सकती है, किन्तु दुराचरण /कदाचार तथा पुलिस द्वारा चरित्र सम्बन्धी प्रतिवेदन पक्ष में न होने होने के मामले में सेवाईें समाप्त की जावेगी, तब किसी प्रकार की लिखित सूचना देना अनिवार्य नहीं है।”
3. As per petitioner pursuant to aforesaid appointment order, he joined the services and was discharging his duties with due honesty and dedication. He received one letter dated 29.10.2015 issued by Secretary Administration Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. informing the petitioner to avail personal hearing before him. However, letter dated 29.10.2015 was vague in as much as there was no indication whatsoever in the letter with regard to subject matter on which personal hearing was to be given to him. Although, it was postponed for 26.11.2015.
4. On 26.11.2015, the petitioner appeared before the Managing Director Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd however, nothing was disclosed even during personal hearing also and it was simply an eye wash.
5. As per petitioner, he was shocked to receive the order dated 20.01.2016 revealing therein that while seeking appointment, an affidavit dated 31.07.2014 was submitted by the petitioner in order to make a statement that no criminal case was pending against him in any Court and he has not been convicted in any criminal case. It was also mentioned in order dated 20.01.2016 that Additional Superintendent of Police, Jaipur has submitted a police verification report indicating therein that a criminal case bearing No.29/2013 under Section 19/54 of Rajasthan Excise Act was registered against the petitioner and the same was decided on 20.07.2013. However, such fact was allegedly suppressed by the petitioner therefore, in view of Condition No.10 of the appointment order, his character and antecedents were not found satisfactory and accordingly his services were terminated.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the said case was registered on 14.01.2013, and date of birth of petitioner is 04.10.2016. Thus, at the time of registration of criminal case against the petitioner, he was a minor and till the date of decision of the aforesaid case vide judgment dated 20.07.2013, he had not attained majority. He submits that vide judgment dated 20.07.2013 although, the petitioner was convicted by the Competent Criminal Court for committing offences under Section 19/54 of Rajasthan Excise Act, 1950, yet he was released on probation after giving benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (for short 'the Act of 1958').
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Section 12 of the Act of 1958 makes it clear that once a benefit under Section 4 has been given to any convict then any disqualification attached to such conviction shall not come in the way of that person for getting service benefits.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that when the petitioner submitted his application form for getting compassionate appointment in place of his deceased father and submitted affidavit dated 31.07.2014, at that time also, age of the petitioner was less than 18 years. In that tender age, he was not in a position to understand the
