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2024 Supreme(Online)(SC) 1798
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1070/2011 SULAIMAN APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS SULAIMAN FAIZI RESPONDENT(S)
Petitioner's Advocate: V. N. RAGHUPATHY
Respondent's Advocate: RAJESH MAHALE
Certainly. Here are the key points from the provided legal document:
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The appellant was accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, but was acquitted by the Trial Court, which found that the presumption under Section 139 was rebutted by the appellant (!) (!) .
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The respondent issued a demand notice alleging that the appellant had borrowed Rs.1,00,000 in cash on 30th May 2003 and issued two cheques dated 22nd July 2003 for Rs.60,000 and Rs.40,000, which were dishonoured (!) (!) .
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The appellant's case was that the cheques were issued prior to the alleged loan date, as they were mentioned in an agreement dated 22nd April 2002, and thus could not have been issued for discharging the debt of May 2003 (!) (!) .
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The respondent's counsel argued that the high court found the liability was based on the 2002 agreement, creating a presumption that the cheques were received for that debt, and therefore, the presumption under Section 139 was not rebutted (!) .
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The court emphasized that the high court should have evaluated whether the acquittal was a plausible finding based on the evidence. Since it was a plausible conclusion, the appellate court found no grounds to interfere with the acquittal (!) .
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The court clarified that the case in the demand notice and complaint was that Rs.1,00,000 was advanced as a loan on 30th May 2003, with the cheques issued on 22nd July 2003 to meet that liability (!) .
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The presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act states that it is presumed the cheque was received for the discharge of a debt unless the contrary is proved. This presumption is rebuttable and can be challenged on preponderance of probabilities (!) (!) .
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The agreement from 2002, which was produced by the appellant, was only admitted to the extent that the cheque numbers mentioned in it were the same as those in the complaint, indicating the cheques predated the alleged loan date. This fact rebutted the presumption that the cheques were for the 2003 debt (!) .
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Since the presumption was rebutted and the respondent failed to prove the liability of Rs.1,00,000 as alleged, the trial court's acquittal was deemed a plausible and justified finding, and the high court's interference was reversed (!) (!) .
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The appellate court set aside the high court's judgment and restored the trial court's order of acquittal, clarifying that their observations were limited to the context of prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act (!) .
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No orders as to costs were made, and the appeal was allowed accordingly (!) .
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The order was signed and pronounced on 7th February 2024 by the Supreme Court of India, with the appeal being disposed of in favor of the appellant (!) .
Let me know if you need further analysis or assistance.
O R D E R
(1) The appellant is the accused in the complaint filed by the respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, “NI Act”). The Trial Court acquitted the appellant. The Trial Court held that the presumption under Section
139 of the NI Act was rebutted by the appellant.
(2) The respondent issued a demand notice dated 22nd October, 2003 to the appellant. The specific case made out in the demand notice was that when the appellant approached him at his residence for the grant of accommodation for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) as a loan, on 30th May, 2003, the respondent paid a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) in cash as a loan. The specific pleading in the demand notice was that the appellant delivered two cheques dated 22nd July, 2003 in the sum of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees Sixty Thousand) and Rs.40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand) respectively. The allegation in the notice was that the cheques were dishonoured and, therefore, the respondent called upon the appellant to pay the amount covered the two cheques. As the Signaaturep Nopt Veerifiledlant did not pay the amount, a complaint was filed under Digitally signed by Anita Malhotra Date: 2024.02.15
09:50:S34 eISTction 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with Reason:
Section 138 of the NI Act. Even in the complaint, the allegation is that on 30th May, 2003, a loan of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) in cash was advanced by the respondent to the appellant and two cheques dated 22nd July, 2003 mentioned above were drawn by the appellant in favour of the respondent.
(3) The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that the Trial Court found that the same cheques were mentioned in the agreement dated 22nd April, 2002 (Exhibit D.1). He submitted that, thus, it is clear that the cheques were not issued by the appellant for discharging the liability of loan allegedly advanced on 30th May, 2003. He would, therefore, submit that the Trial Court rightly acquitted the appellant.
(4) The learned counsel appearing for the respondent invited our attention to paragraph 9 of the impugned judgment of the High Court. He submitted that the High Court found that, in fact, the liability was under the said agreement of 2002 and, therefore, there is a presumption that the respondent received the cheques for discharge of the debt/liability which is mentioned in the said agreement of 2002. He would, therefore, submit that no interference with the impugned judgment is called for.
(5) We have considered the submissions. The High Court was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. The first issue for consideration before the High Court ought to have been whether on the basis of the evidence on record before the learned Magistrate, the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned Magistrate was a plausible finding. However, the High Court rendered no finding on this aspect. The law is well-settled in this regard that if the finding recorded is a plausible finding, even if the other view is possible, no interference can be made in an appeal against acquittal.
(6) As pointed out earlier, the specific case in the demand notice and in the complaint of the respondent was that a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) was advanced as a loan in cash by the respondent on 30th May, 2003 to the appellant and for meeting the said liability, that the two cheques in the sum of Rs.60,000/- (Rupees Sixty Thousand) and Rs.40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand)
were issued on 22nd July, 2003 by the appellant.
(7) Section 139 of the NI Act reads thus:
“139. Presumption in favour of holder.—It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.”
(8) It is well-settled that the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act is rebuttable and the accused can rebut the said presumption even on preponderance of pr
