O R D E R

Leave granted.

The appellant herein has assailed the Order dated 12.06.2023 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench in Misc. Crl. Case No. 21226/2023, by which, order dated 26.04.2023 passed by the 15th Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior (M.P.) in Criminal Revision No.308/2022 was dismissed by affirming order dated 13.07.2022 passed by the trial court, JMFC, District Gwalior, M. P. in Special Case No. (N.I. Act) 373/2019. As a result a direction issued by the Trial Court to the appellant herein to pay 20% of the cheque amount of Rs.50,00,000/- under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as, “the Act.”) was sustained.

We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent and perused the material on record. During the course of submission, learned counsel for the appellant Signadturer Noet Vewrifie d our attention to the impugned order of the Trial Court dated Digitally signed by Neetu Sachdeva Date: 2024.04.01

17:22:149 3IST.07.2022, by which the application filed under Section 143-A of Reason:

the Act was allowed and a direction was issued to the appellant herein to pay interim compensation of 20% of the cheque amount being Rs.50,00,000/- to the complainant, within a period of sixty days from the date of the said order.

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the said order is vitiated as no prima facie finding has been arrived at for issuing the aforesaid direction. It was submitted that the cheques were issued by the appellant herein to the father of the respondent-complainant with regard to a loan transaction and by way of security, which have been misused by the respondent herein by filing the complaint as against the appellant herein which is an abuse of the process of law. The surrounding facts and circumstances regarding the filing of the complaints and the case of the appellant herein have been totally ignored while making the said order dated 13.07.2022 by the trial court. He further submitted that the said direction has been simply affirmed by the First Appellate Court as well as by the High Court without ascertaining as to, whether, there was any reason for issuance of the said direction and whether, the discretion was properly exercised by the Trial Court in issuing such a direction.

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant would be successful in establishing that there was no case whatsoever for the respondent-complainant to file the complaint at all under Section 138 of the Act and, therefore, the impugned orders may be set aside and the appeal may be allowed. In support of his submissions, the appellant’s counsel placed reliance on a recent judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava V/s. State of Jharkhand & Anr., 2024 SCC Online SC 309 (“Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava”), and has taken us through the relevant paras of the said judgment, which we shall advert to later.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent supported the impugned orders and contended that the respondent- complainant has a good case on merits; that the impugned order clearly establishes that there was a prima facie case made out in favour of the complainant and, therefore, the direction was issued and the judgment cited on behalf of the appellant would not apply to this case. He submitted that there is no merit in this appeal and the same may be dismissed.

Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties, we note that the respondent-complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Act on the premise that a cheque was issued by the appellant in favour of the respondent owing to the respondent lending a sum of Rs.50,00,000/- in cash to the appellant and since the said amount was not returned by the appellant to the respondent, the latter was constrained to file a complaint under Section 138 of the Act. Section 143-A of the Act was inserted by way of an amendment by Act No