Prolonged incarceration without timely trial violates the right to speedy trial under Article 21, necessitating careful consideration of bail under stringent provisions.

JUDGEMENT

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

1. Special leave granted. With consent of counsel for parties, the appeal was heard finally.

2. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secy., State of Bihar 1 this court had declared that the right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted 1 [1979] 3 SCR 1276: (1980) 1 SCC 81 Digitally signed by NEETA SAPRA Date: 2023.03.28 18:23:37 IST Reason:

Signature Not Verified by this Court”. Remarking that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just” it was held that:

“Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.”

3. These observations have resonated, time and again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya & Ors. v. State of Bihar2 and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak3; in the latter the court re-emphasized the right to speedy trial, and further held that an accused, facing prolonged trial, has no option:

“The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large majority of accused come from poorer and weaker sections of the society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do not often get competent legal advice, the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused demands speedy trial and yet he is not given one, may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of his right to speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy trial.”

4. These issues have pivotal meaning to the facts of this case. The appellant complains that his application for bail ought not to have been rejected by the High Court, in the present case, considering that he has suffered incarceration for over 7 years and the criminal trial has hardly reached the half-way mark.

2 (1981) 3 SCC 671 3 [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 325: (1992) 1 SCC 225 The appellant is accused of committing offences punishable under Sections 20, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereafter ‘NDPS Act’). His application under Section 439 read with Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereafter ‘CrPC’), seeking grant of regular bail, before the Delhi High Court, was denied by the impugned judgment4.

Some other facts important to the decision in this case, are that at the time of his arrest, the appellant was 23 years. He was not found in possession of the narcotic drug; other co-accused were.

5. The prosecution alleges that on 28.09.2015, based on secret information received by the police, a raid was conducted, leading to arrest of four accused persons - Nitesh Ekka, Sanjay Chauhan, Sharif Khan, and Virender Shakiyar/Sakyabar @