The High Court determined that eviction disputes under the Airports Authority of India Act are not arbitrable, requiring resolution through statutory authority instead.

O R D E R

1. These petitions arise from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay essentially centering around the seminal question whether the disputes and differences relating to eviction and recovery of dues under the lease deeds governing the two parcels of land fall within the scope of the arbitration agreements contained in the lease deeds particularly in the light of the inherent deeming declarations and exclusions contained in the lease deeds.

2. The High Court vide its impugned judgment and order dated 09^th June, 2025 has while finally disposing of the appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act read with Section 28K of the Airports Authority of India Act (for short “the AAI Act”)

summarised its final conclusion as under:-

“66.

a) The arbitration agreements executed between AAI and Leela, which are contained in the lease deeds, do not cover within their ambit, the subject matter of eviction of unauthorised occupation by Leela of the leased land, and recovery of associated rent and damages;

b) The parties had explicitly agreed to the position that the land leased to Leela would constitute public premises despite the construction of the building for conduct of business of the hotel and flight kitchen. Therefore, one need not look beyond the contract and into legislation to determine if eviction is excluded from the scope of arbitration;

c) The reference to the Public Premises Eviction Act in each of the lease deeds leads to the identification of the class of disputes and differences for their exclusion from coverage by arbitration. The reference to the said legislation has the effect of affirming the parties' consensual commitment by contract that eviction and related recoveries would fall outside the scope of arbitration. This is not a provision by which AAI is obliged not to avail of statutory powers to effect eviction of unauthorised users of the land;

d) The introduction of Chapter VA in the AAI Act is a new power granted by Parliament after execution of the lease deeds, to enable a public authority such as the AAI to recover its premises being used by persons without authority. Eviction and recovery of lease rentals from public premises being outside the scope of arbitration, whether some other legislation is utilised is of no consequence to the core issue arising in these proceedings. That legislative purpose and objective of the AAI Act is being undermined by the contentions and arguments about such land not being "airport premises" which is neither relevant nor in consonance with the committed contractual position that the land leased to Leela by AAI constitutes public premises;

e) There was no requirement to amend the lease deeds to replace references to Public Premises Eviction Act with references to the AAI Act. Such a course of action was totally unnecessary since what is achieved by the provisions of the lease deeds is to exclude eviction and recovery from arbitration;

f) Both the leases - for the 18,000 Land and the 11,000 Land – have expired. Prima facie, the continued occupation of the land is unauthorised and squarely brings the matter within the jurisdiction of Chapter VA of the AAI Act. This has no implication for the arbitration agreements, which in any case, provided for eviction of the land under the then applicable law, to be outside the scope of arbitration;

g) Whether or not one could hold that the lease for the 18,000 Land was extended for another 30 years on the same terms without any revision and on the same terms and conditions, is a facet of the matter that can be eminently argued by Leela before the Eviction Officer when attempting to show cause in reply to Eviction Officer's notice. Pri