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2025 Supreme(Online)(SC) 9843

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
MANMOHAN, J, N.V. ANJARIA,J
SANJABIJ TARI – Appellant
Versus
KISHORE S. BORCAR & ANR. – Respondent
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1755 OF 2010



Advocates:
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Mr. Amarjit Singh Bedi
For the Respondents: Mr. Ankit Yadav

Once the execution of a cheque is admitted, the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act arises, placing the onus on the drawer to prove non-liability in cases of dishonour.

Headnote:(A) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 - Criminal appeal against acquittal - High Court reversed the concurrent findings of both Trial Court and Sessions Court regarding dishonoured cheque; error in revising without considering established facts - Presumption under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act reinforces that once a cheque is admitted, it is for the accused to rebut the presumption of a legally enforceable debt - Acquittal challenged as High Court acted without perverse finding, failing to recognize earlier findings. (Paras 3, 15, 27, 30, 32)

(B) Presumption - In cases of dishonour of cheques, the onus is on the drawer to prove the cheque is not in discharge of any liability, particularly when evidence supports existence of debt - Legal provisions intended to restore confidence in cheque transactions need to be upheld without lengthy litigation. (Paras 11, 19, 21, 29)

Facts of the case:
Appellant challenges High Court’s order reversing lower courts' convictions based on dishonoured cheque, asserting the debt is legally enforceable. The Respondent’s financial capabilities were disputed but without substantial evidence. (Paras 2-5)

Findings of Court:
High Court's order set aside; the acquittal is reversed, and Respondent is directed to pay in installments. (Paras 24, 40)

Issues: Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to overturn concurrent findings and whether the existence of a legally enforceable debt was adequately rebutted. (Paras 27, 28)

Ratio Decidendi: The principle that, in Section 138 cases, the presumption of liability is crucial and can only be rebutted with substantial evidence; the inherent judicial mandate under the NI Act promotes swift resolution. (Paras 15, 19, 38)

Result: Appeal allowed, original judgments restored with payment conditions. (Para 40)

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Here are the key points derived from the provided legal document:

  1. Once the execution of a cheque is admitted, the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments (NI) Act arises, placing the initial burden on the drawer to prove non-liability in cases of cheque dishonour (!) (!) .

  2. The presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act reinforces that, upon admission of execution, it is for the accused to rebut the presumption of a legally enforceable debt or liability (!) (!) .

  3. The law aims to promote confidence in cheque transactions by criminalizing issuance of cheques without sufficient funds or for other reasons, thereby encouraging financial discipline and swift dispute resolution (!) (!) .

  4. In cases of dishonoured cheques, the burden shifts to the drawer to demonstrate that the cheque was not issued in discharge of any liability, especially when evidence supports the existence of debt (!) .

  5. The rebuttable presumption under Section 139 can be challenged by the accused by providing substantial evidence, such as proof of financial incapacity or disputes regarding the debt, shifting the onus back to the complainant to prove the debt’s enforceability (!) (!) .

  6. It is essential that the respondent or accused does not produce false or unsubstantiated evidence regarding their financial capacity, as failure to do so can lead to an inference that the debt was valid and enforceable (!) (!) .

  7. The absence of documents or evidence from the accused to establish their financial incapacity weakens their defence, and the presumption of liability remains intact unless rebutted with credible proof (!) (!) .

  8. The initial burden on the complainant includes proving the issuance of a cheque in discharge of a debt, dishonour of the cheque, and proper service of statutory notices, with the failure to reply to such notices or to produce supporting evidence strengthening the presumption of liability (!) (!) .

  9. The defence that a cheque was issued as a blank cheque for obtaining a loan is generally considered unbelievable unless convincingly supported by credible evidence (!) .

  10. The proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act are essentially quasi-criminal but are designed to be expeditious and are closely aligned with civil and summary proceedings, emphasizing quick resolution and discouraging unnecessary delays (!) (!) .

  11. Due to the significant backlog of cheque bouncing cases, procedural guidelines have been issued to enhance service of summons, promote settlement, and facilitate expeditious disposal, including service by electronic means and online payment options (!) (!) .

  12. The law encourages the possibility of compounding offences at early stages of proceedings, with specified guidelines on costs and conditions for such settlements, aiming to reduce litigation and promote amicable resolutions (!) (!) .

  13. The appeal in the case resulted in setting aside the High Court’s order and restoring the original judgments of the Trial and Sessions Courts, with a specific payment plan directed for the respondent to settle the debt in installments (!) .

  14. The guidelines emphasize that service of summons should be broadened beyond traditional methods, including direct and electronic service, to ensure faster case processing (!) (!) .

  15. The procedure for trial can be simplified, with initial questions to the accused during proceedings to determine the case’s suitability for summary trial, and the courts are encouraged to facilitate early settlement through online payment and other mechanisms (!) (!) (!) (!) .

  16. The proceedings under Section 138 are to be treated as a matter of private dispute with criminal overtones, emphasizing the importance of quick disposal and the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including mediation and compounding (!) (!) .

  17. The law provides for the possibility of settlement and compounding at various stages of the proceedings, with guidelines on costs and conditions to encourage early resolution and reduce the judicial backlog (!) (!) .

  18. The judicial system is directed to implement these guidelines promptly, and courts are expected to actively promote settlement options, including online and immediate payment methods, to ensure timely resolution of cheque bounce cases (!) (!) .

These points reflect the core legal principles, procedural guidelines, and case-specific outcomes as outlined in the provided document.


Table of Content
1. challenge to high court acquittal under ni act. (Para 1)
2. arguments by appellant regarding legal enforceability of debt. (Para 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6)
3. arguments by respondent concerning financial capacity. (Para 7 , 8 , 9 , 10)
4. scope and intent of chapter xvii of ni act. (Para 11 , 12 , 13 , 14)
5. presumptions under sections 118 and 139 of ni act. (Para 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21)
6. failure of respondent to provide evidence of incapacity. (Para 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26)
7. judicial expectation of acknowledging notice responses. (Para 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31)
8. unreliable defense claims provided by respondent. (Para 32)
9. guidelines for expeditious disposal of cheque bouncing cases. (Para 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39)
10. appeal allowed, restoring lower court judgments. (Para 40)

JUDGMENT

MANMOHAN, J.

1. The present Appeal has been filed challenging the ex-parte judgment and order dated 16th April 2009 passed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa acquitting the Respondent No.1-Accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘NI Act’) and reversing the concurrent judgments of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT-COMPLAINANT

2. Mr. Amarjit Singh Bedi, learned counsel for the Appellant-Complainant submitted that the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction erred in upsetting the conviction of the Respondent No.1-Accused under Section 138 of the NI Act based on categorical findings of facts rendered by both the Courts below that the dishonoured cheque had been issued in favour of the Appellant-

Complainant in discharge of a legally enforceable debt.

3. He contended that there was no evidence on record to establish that the Appellant-Complainant did not have the financial means to advance a friendly loan of Rs.6,00,000/- (Rupees Six Lakhs) to the Respondent No.1-Accused . He emphasised that the Appellant-Complainant in his statement under oath had stated that in order to oblige his friend/Respondent No.1-Accused , the Appellant- Complainant had arranged money from his father, who was a cloth merchant having two shops and even went to the extent of parting with a portion of the loan amount which he himself had borrowed from a financial institution.

4. He pointed out that the Respondent No.1-Accused during the course of arguments on sentencing before the Trial Court had prayed for leniency on the ground that he was ready to pay the cheque amount to the Appellant-Complainant within a reasonable time.

5. He further stated that though the Appellant-Complainant filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘Cr.P.C.’) for recall of the impugned judgment by substantiating sufficient cause for the absence of his advocate on 16th April 2009, yet the learned Single Judge had been pleased to dismiss the said application holding that the Court had become functus officio and it had no jurisdiction under criminal law to recall the impugned order. He submitted that the High Court erred in not exercising its inherent powers to set aside the impugned judgment which, for all legal purposes, was an ex-parte order.

6. He lastly stated that if this Court were to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the concurrent judgments of the Trial Court and Sessions Court, the Appellant-Complainant would accept the payment of outstanding amount in instalments as directed by the Trial Court.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.1-ACCUSED

7. Per contra, Mr. Ankit Yadav, learned counsel for the Respondent No.1- Accused stated that the Appellant-Complainant was being paid a salary of only Rs.2,300/- (Rupees Two Thousand and Three Hundred) per month at the relevant point of time, which was not even adequate to take care of his family, leave alone sufficient to advance a loan of Rs.6,00,000/- (Rupees Six Lakhs). He contended that the Appellant-Complainant was a highly indebted person who did not have any source of income other t

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