Unexplained delay in an arbitral award that adversely affects findings, or an "unworkable" award that irrevocably alters party positions without final resolution, is patently illegal and contrary to public policy. Article 142 may be exercised to achieve complete justice and end such protracted litigation.

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KUMAR, J

1. Two questions arise for consideration in these appeals: -

(i) What is the effect of undue and unexplained delay in the pronouncement of an arbitral award upon its validity?

(ii) Is an arbitral award that is unworkable, in terms of not settling the disputes between the parties finally while altering their positions irrevocably thereby leaving them no choice but to initiate further litigation, liable to be set aside on grounds of perversity, patent illegality and being opposed to the public policy of India? If so, would it be a fit case for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution?

In this case, the learned Arbitrator reserved his arbitral award on 28.07.2012 but pronounced it only on 16.03.2016, i.e., nearly three years and Signature Not Verified D ba igeb i i t t a a li ly pg a s n ig dhn e e y dt b ymonths later, with no definite resolution of the matter. Significantly, no Date: 2025.10.31 Reason: explanation worth the name was offered by him for the delay.

2. The issue of delay in the delivery of an arbitral award is relevant now only in the context of the period prior to insertion of Section 29A in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the Act of 1996’), which put in place stringent timelines for passing of an arbitral award. During that earlier era, the question as to whether long delay in the passing of the award would impact its validity, to the extent of that award being set aside on that ground under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, was considered by different High Courts.

3. In Harji Engg. Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. and another 1, (2009) 107 DRJ 213 = (2008) 153 DLT 489 a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court was faced with an arbitral award that was pronounced with a delay of over three years. No explanation was offered in the award for the delay. On facts, the learned Judge found that the hearings in the arbitration had not even concluded. In that scenario, the learned Judge formulated the question as to whether the delay of more than three years and, thereafter, the haste in which the award was passed made it contrary to public policy? Noting that Section 28 of the erstwhile Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short, ‘the Act of 1940’), empowered the Court to enlarge the time for making an award but delay in the making of an award otherwise amounted to grave misconduct and was sufficient to set aside that award under Sections 30 and 33 thereof, the learned Judge observed that no specific period was prescribed in the Act of 1996 for making and publishing the award. The learned Judge, however, opined that the underlying principle and policy of law remained intact that arbitration proceedings should not be unduly prolonged and delayed. It was observed that it is natural and normal for an arbitrator to forget contentions and pleas raised by the parties during the course of hearing, if there was a huge gap between the last date of hearing and the date on which the award was made and, therefore, an arbitrator should make and publish an award within reasonable time. What was reasonable time was flexible, per the learned Judge, and would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Further, it was opined that in the event there is delay, it should be explained, as abnormal delay without satisfactory explanation would amount to undue delay and would cause prejudice. Holding that arbitration proceedings must be concluded expeditiously so as to be just, fair and effective, the learned Judge observed that the statute imposed additional responsibilities and obligations upon the arbitrator to make and publish the award within reasonable time and without undue delay. The learned Judge held that a party must be satisfied that the arbitrator was conscious of and had taken into consideration all contentions and pleas before rejecting or partly rejecting a claim. This was held to be the right of the party which should not be denied. The learned