SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2001 Supreme(Online)(SC) 22

SUPREME COURT
K. T. Thomas, *R. P. Sethi, JJ.
Dr. Surajmani Stella Kujur v. Durga Charan Hansdah And Another
Crl. A. No. 186 of 2001



The applicability of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, requires proof of legal customs for prosecution of bigamy; merely alleging custom is insufficient.

Headnote:This case examines the question of who qualifies as a 'Hindu' under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Act is applicable to all Hindus and certain other religions but does not apply if a notification is issued under Article 342 of the Constitution. In this case, both parties are tribals deemed 'Hindus' in the absence of such a notification. Although the appellant alleges that a customs-based rule of monogamy should apply, it is essential that any such customs must be proven to have legal standing. The trial and High Court dismissed the appellant's complaint due to a lack of specific pleadings regarding the alleged custom making the second marriage void, holding that no offence under the Indian Penal Code is prima facie established. The appellant’s rights to maintenance and succession must be pursued separately in civil proceedings. As a result, the appeal is dismissed.

1 Leave granted.

2Who is a "Hindu" for the purposes of the applicability of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), is a question of law to be determined in this appeal.

3S.2 of the Act specifies the persons to whom the Act is applicable. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of S.2 make the Act applicable to a person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj and to persons who is a Buddhist, Jain or Sikh by religion. It is also applicable to any other person domiciled in the territories of India who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion. The applicability of the Act is, therefore, comprehensive and applicable to all persons domiciled in the territory of India who are not Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews by religion.

4The term "Hindu" has not been defined either under the Act or Indian Succession Act or any other enactment of the Legislature. As far back as in 1903 the Privy Council in Bhagwan Koer v. J.C. Bose and Others [ILR (XXXI) Calcutta Series 11] observed:
"We shall not attempt here to lay down a general definition of what is meant by the term 'Hindu', to make it accurate and at the same time sufficiently comprehensive as well as distinctive is extremely difficult. The Hindu religion is marvellously catholic and elastic. Its theology is marked by eclecticism and tolerance and almost unlimited freedom of private worship. Its social code is much more stringent, but amongst its different castes and sections exhibits wide diversity of practice. No trait is more marked of Hindu society in general than its horror of using the meat of the cow. Yet the Chamars who profess Hinduism, but who eat beef and the flesh of dead animals, are however low in the scale included within its pale. It is easier to say who are not Hindus, not practically and separation of Hindus from non Hindus is not a matter of so much difficulty. The people know the differences well and can easily tell who are Hindus and who are not."

5The Act, is, therefore, applicable to:
"(1) All Hindus including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat, a Brahmo, Prarthana Samajist and an Arya Samajist,
(2) Buddhists
(3) Jains
(4) Sikhs.

6 In this appeal the parties are admittedly tribals, the appellant being a Oraon and the respondent a Santhal. In the absence of a notification or order under Art.342 of the Constitution they are deemed to be Hindus. Even if a notification is issued under the Constitution, the Act can be applied to Scheduled Tribes as well by a further notification in terms of Sub-section (2) of S.2 of the Act. It is not disputed before us that in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 as amended by Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order (Amendment) Acts 63 of 1956, 108 of 1976, 18 of 1987 and 15 of 1990, both the tribes to which the parties belong are specified in Part XII. It is conceded even by the appellant that "the parties to the petition are two Tribals, who otherwise profess Hinduism, but their marriage being out of the purview of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in light of S.2(2) of the Act, are thus governed only by their Santhal Customs and usage".

7 The appellant has, however, relied upon an alleged custom in the Tribe which mandates monogamy as a rule. It is submitted that as the respondent has solemnised a second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage with the appellant, the second marriage being void, the respondent is liable to be prosecuted for the offence punishable under S.494 of the Indian Penal Code .

8 No custom can create an offence as it essentially deals with the civil rights of the parties and no person can be convicted of any offence except for violation of law in force at the time of commission of the act charged. Custom may be proved for the determination of the civil rights of the parties including their status, the establishment of which may be used for the pur














Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top