PETITIONER:

BANSI LAL & ORS.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

LAXMAN SINGH DATE OF JUDGMENT15/07/1986 BENCH:

ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)

BENCH:

ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)

DUTT, M.M. (J)

CITATION:

1986 AIR 1721 1986 SCR (3) 191

1986 SCC (3) 444 JT 1986 49

1986 SCALE (2)2 ACT:

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-S. 439-High Court-

Revisional Jurisdiction-When entitled to set aside order of acquittal of Trial Court and order re-trial.

HEADNOTE:

The appellants, after trial by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge on a charge of murder under s. 302 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code, were acquitted giving them the benefit of doubt.

The respondent, a son of the deceased victim, preferred a criminal revision petition before the High Court under s. 397/401 Cr.P.C. challenging the order of acquittal. A Single Judge allowed the revision petition, set aside the acquittal of the appellants and remitted the case to the trial Court for re-trial.

The appellants appealed to this Court, inter alia, contending that the Single Judge of the High Court has transgressed the bounds of his revisional jurisdiction in reappreciating the evidence and setting aside their acquittal.

Allowing the appeal, ^

HELD: 1. The High Court has clearly transgressed the limits of its revisional jurisdiction under s. 439(4) of Cr. P.C. in setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge and directing a re-trial of the case. [197F]

2. Even in an appeal against an order of acquittal no interference will be made with the judgment of the trial Court except in rare and exceptional cases where there has been some manifest illegality in the approach to the case or in the appreciation of the evidence or where the conclusion of fact recorded by the Trial Judge is wholly unreasonable so as to be liable to be characterised as perverse and there bas been a

resultant miscarriage of justice. The revisional

jurisdiction of the High Court while dealing with an order

of acquittal passed by the trial court is more narrow in its

scope. It is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting

from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a re-trial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. [195A-C]

K.C. Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1963] 3 SCR

412; D. Stenbens v. Nosibolla, [1951] SCR 284; Jogendranath Jha v. Polailal Biswas, [1951] SCR 676; Akalu Ahir and Ors. v. Ramdeo Ram, [1974] I SCR 130; Amar Chand Aggarwal v. Shanti Bose, AIR 1973 SC 799; and Satyendra Nath Dutta and Anr. v. Ram Narain, [1975] 2 SCR 743 followed.

3. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and directing a re-trial of the accused.

[197C]

In the instant case, the High Court did not keep in mind the principles regarding the limits of its revisional powers while dealing with the order of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, which did not suffer from any manifest illegality. The dominant justification of the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court is the view it took of the evidence of the two eye-witnesses. Having carefully gone through the records of the case, this Court is satisfied that it was a possible view and it cannot be characterised as illegal or perverse. It may well be that the Single Judge of the High Court was not inclined to agree with the trial Court’s finding on the basis of his independent scrutiny and appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case but that would not furnish any justification for interference in revision with the order of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. Even in an appeal the Appellate Court would not have been justified in interfering with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact reached by the t