2026 Supreme(Online)(SC) 2069
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Ashok – Appellant
Versus
Mahesh – Respondent
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 5370-5371 OF 2026
##PAGE1##
2026 INSC 1235 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 5370-5371 OF 2026 [@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 7056-7057 of 2025]
Ashok ..….Appellant(s)
Versus Mahesh & Anr. ……. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
K. V. Viswanathan, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) The present appeals call in question the correctness of the order dated 27.11.2024 in Criminal Application Nos. 1371 of 2020 and 3235 of 2021 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad. By the said order, the High Court allowed the applications filed by Respondent No. 1 and DHD1R8 iAae g :ta R3 iet s3 aP:o : l2lR2n y00: E s2 EIqi6S gT.n T1 eK1d.uA1 bU7yRashed the proceedings pending against him in RCC No.
1020 of 2023 and RCC No. 119 of 2024 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhule. In RCC No. 1020 of 2023, chargesheet was filed for offences under Sections 465, 466, 468, 471, 474, 420, 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the IPC’) and in RCC No. 119 of 2024, chargesheet was filed for offences under Sections 465, 466, 468, 471, 474, 420,120B and 34 of the IPC.
##PAGE2##3) The short ground on which the proceedings were quashed was that under the Maharashtra Amendment Act XXXIII of 2016 to Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short ‘the Cr.P.C.’), even for ordering a Section 156(3) investigation against a public servant in respect of acts done by such public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, sanction under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. was required. Further, it was held that for the proviso to the said amendment to apply, providing for application of the principle of deemed sanction, the application had to be made to the competent authority. In the present case, applications were made to Settlement Commissioner and Director of Land Records (Maharashtra State) and in another case to the Settlement Commissioner, which authorities, according to the High Court, were not the competent authorities.
##PAGE3##4) Under the circumstances, the High Court, by the impugned order, recorded the following findings: -
“11. …….Therefore, it ought to have been considered by the learned Magistrate, as to whether the Settlement Commissioner, who is certainly the superior officer of the applicant, had the power to appoint and remove the applicant or not. The learned Advocate for the applicant is making available the photocopy of promotion order passed by the Government of Maharashtra on 17th September 2007, wherein the present applicant was promoted from Class-III post to Class-II post and therefore, it is not in dispute that the State Government is the removing authority. The hierarchy in the office is not relevant for according sanction to prosecute, but it depends upon the power to appoint and remove from service. Therefore, when respondent No.2 had made application to the wrong authority and the wrong authority / the authority who was not competent, had not taken any action on the application filed by respondent No.2 for more than 90 days, the same will not give the deeming effect. In other words, inaction of an authority who is not competent to accord sanction, will not give advantage to respondent No.2 to take advantage of the deeming provision in Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Here, in the present case, there was no sanction at all to prosecute the applicant nor there was a deemed sanction. The learned Magistrate could not have passed the order directing the investigation to be made under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The First Information Reports based on the said orders cannot be allowed to sustain as there is inherent defect, and therefore, even the proceedings will not be allowed to proceed further. It would be unjust to ask the applicant to face the trial on the basis of such inherent defect. Therefore, this is a fit case where we should exercise our powers under Section 482 of t