2026 Supreme(Online)(SCDRC) 1152
STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
A TO ZEE VISAS – Appellant
Versus
MANISHA NAYAL – Respondent
SC/7/FA/85/2025
IN THE DELHI STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION Date of Institution:19.02.2025 (Online)
25.02.2025 (Physically)
Date of hearing : 20.02.2026 Date of Decision : 24.02.2026 FIRST APPEAL NO. 85/2025 IN THE MATTER OF A TO ZEE VISAS PVT. LTD.
HAVING OFFICE:
A-66, TOP FLOOR, FIEE COMPLEX OKHLA PHASE-II, NEW DELHI-110020 (Through Mr. Ramandeep Bawa, Advocate Email: ramandeepbawa87@gmail.com Mob.9711429298)
…APPLICANT/APPELLANT VERSUS MANISHA NAYAL 76H, POCKET A-I NEAR DDA MARKET A-I MAYUR VIHAR PHASE-III DELHI-110096 ....NON-APPLICANT/RESPONDENT CORAM:
HON’BLE JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL (PRESIDENT)
Present: Mr. Mujeeb Rehman, counsel for the appellant.
None for the respondent.
PER: HON’BLE JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL (PRESIDENT)
1. The present appeal has been filed on 19.02.2025 (online) and
25.02.2025 (physically) challenging the impugned order dated 02.08.2024 passed in Complaint Case No.379/2023 by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-X (South-East District), Udyog Sadan, C-22 & 23, Qutub Institutional Area, Behind Qutub Hotel Mehrauli, New Delhi-110016 (hereinafter referred as the District Commission).
2. This order will dispose off an application bearing IA No.1099/2025 seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal, filed vide diary no. 6074 dated 15.05.2025. Affidavit of Mr. Tarun Pareek, Authorized Representative of the appellant has been filed along with this application.
3. Record has been carefully and thoroughly perused.
4. The application has been moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, it is being considered under Section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 as it is arising out of Complaint Case No.379/2023.
5. Application for condonation of delay has been filed on various grounds. Para No. 3 of the application reads as under: “3. That the appellant has applied for the certified copy of the impugned order dated 02.08.2024 on 06.09.2024 and the same was prepared and delivered on 04.10.2024. Thereby the same period shall be excluded for counting limitation period by virtue of section 12 of the limitation act, 1963.”
6. To adjudicate this issue, I deem it appropriate to refer to Section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which provides as under:-
41. “Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Commission may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission on the grounds of facts or law within a period of forty-five days from the date of the order, in such form and manner, as may be prescribed:
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:
Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Commission, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited fifty percent of that amount in the manner as may be prescribed:
Provided also that no appeal shall lie from any order passed under sub-section (1) of section 81 by the District Commission pursuant to a settlement by mediation under section 80.”
7. A perusal of the aforesaid statutory position reflects that the appeal against an impugned order should be preferred within a period of forty five days from the date of such order. On perusal of record before us, it is clear that the impugned judgment was pronounced on 02.08.2024 and the present appeal was filed on 19.02.2025 (online) and 25.02.2025 (physically) i.e. after a delay of 156 days and 162 days respectively.
8. In order to condone the delay, the appellant has to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the stipulated period. The term ‘sufficient cause’ has been explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under:-
“9. Sufficient cau