State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission U.T., Chandigarh [Additional Bench]

CC/109/2025 Raj Rani Mittal Vs. PUDA & another.

BEFORE:

PADMA PANDEY, PRESIDING MEMBER RAJESH . ARYA, MEMBER ARGUED BY :-

Ms. Keerti Sandhu, Advocate for the complainant.

Dated: 11.12.2025.

ORDER Heard Learned Counsel for the complainant at the preliminary stage on the point of preliminary jurisdiction and unfair contract.

2] It has been contended by the Counsel for the complainant that the terms of the allotment letter dated 27.10.2005, Annexure C-1 being unfair contract, this Commission has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the present complaint and secondly, the total paid up consideration being Rs.68,85,645.81 i.e. [Rs.33,51,125.00 being the total sale consideration of the plot + ₹6,78,620.81 as interest on delayed payment + Rs.28,55,900.00 as non-construction charges/construction extension fee for the period from October 2008 to March 2024], the pecuniary jurisdiction vests with the State Commission and the said charges shall form total consideration paid by the complainant to the opposite parties to determine the pecuniary jurisdiction of Consumer Fora.

3] The first limb of the argument raised by the learned Counsel for the complainant is that the allotment letter dated 27.10.2005 (Annexure C-1) embodies an unfair contract and therefore, this Commission retains jurisdiction to entertain the present complaint. This contention is wholly misconceived and legally untenable. The complainant’s prolonged inaction, remaining silent for almost twenty years and objecting only when non- construction charges were finally imposed, clearly disentitles him from terming the allotment letter issued in 2005 as unfair contract. The well- established principles of laches, acquiescence and estoppel prevent the complainant from challenging contractual terms of allotment after such an unreasonable delay. Law does not assist a party who knowingly sleeps over his rights. By remaining silent for two decades, the complainant effectively represented that he accepted those conditions. Therefore, the complainant cannot be allowed to the terms of the allotment letter after twenty years.

4] As regards the second limb of argument raised by the Counsel for the complainant is concerned, it may be stated here that the penalty imposed for non-construction of a house within the stipulated period cannot be added to or treated as part of the sale consideration of the plot while computing the pecuniary jurisdiction. The pecuniary jurisdiction is to be determined on the basis of the value of the goods or services paid as consideration. Penalty for non-construction is neither the “consideration” for the plot nor an amount representing the “value of service hired”; it is merely a consequential or coercive charge imposed by the developer or authority, having no nexus with the original sale price. Delayed construction penalties and extension fees are independent levies and do not alter the agreed sale consideration of the plot. Accordingly, such penalties/non-construction charges have to be independency considered while determining whether the complaint falls within the pecuniary limits of the District Commission, State Commission or National Commission under the Consumer Protection Act. If such an interpretation is to be accepted namely, that non-construction charges or penalties for failure to raise construction within the stipulated period form part of the total consideration paid or constitute a component of the sale consideration of the plot, it would completely defeat the legislative intent underlying the Consumer Protection Act. Such a construction would confer an unwarranted leverage upon consumers to artificially inflate the valuation of their claims by adding long-outstanding non-construction charges, often unpaid for several years or even decades, to the original sale consideration of the plot, solely for the purpose of invoking the pecuniary jurisdiction of an appellate or high