An application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal requires a satisfactory explanation of 'sufficient cause'; without evidence of bona fide conduct and detailed justification for the delay, courts must strictly enforce statutory limitation periods to ensure expeditious adjudication of consumer disputes.

PER: HON’BLE MS. BIMLA KUMARI, MEMBER (FEMALE)

1. The present appeal has been filed on 16.01.2026 challenging the impugned order dated 06.06.2025 passed in Complaint Case No.43/2017 by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-X (South District), Udyog Sadan, C-22 & 23, Qutub Institutional Area, Behind Qutub Hotel Mehrauli, New Delhi-110016 (hereinafter referred as the District Commission).

2. This order will dispose off an application bearing IA No.157/2025 seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal, filed along with the appeal. Affidavit of the appellant has been filed along with this application.

3. We considered the submissions put forth by the appellant and carefully perused the record.

4. The application has been moved without mentioning any provision of law. Hence, before delving into the merits of the present application, it is imperative to ascertain whether the present application bearing IA No. 157/2025 filed along with the appeal on 16.01.2026 is maintainable under the New Act/Old Act.

5. The repeal of a law shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment i.e. the proceedings under Consumer Protection Act, 1986 shall continue for cases which had been filed prior to the implementation of Consumer Protection Act, 2019 on 20.07.2020. The same can be gauged through the repeal and saving section (Section 107) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which has been reproduced below:

“107. (1) The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is hereby repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under the Act hereby repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act.

(3) The mention of particular matters in sub-section (2) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with regard to the effect of repeal.”

6. We may also take the assistance of Section 6 (b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to further this view. Section 6 (b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 has been reproduced below:

“6 Effect of repeal. : Where this Act, or any 1 [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not

(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or

(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder”

7. Moreover, unless the legislature explicitly provides that the amendment is retrospective in nature, it will be considered prospective. The aforesaid view has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd. reported in (2015) 1 SCC 1 wherein the Court discussed the proviso to Section 113 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and held that it was prospective and not retrospective. While deciding the case, the Constitution Bench laid down certain general principles which have been reproduced as under:

“28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the ev