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2024 Supreme(Online)(TEL) 20723

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA WRIT PETITION No.22320 of 2004

ORDER:

This writ petition is filed by Union Bank of India (Bank, for short)

assailing the Award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal- cum-Labour Court, dated 31.03.2004, in respect of 2nd respondent-Mr.

R.Devdas (hereinafter, the Workman).

2. Brief facts of the case, as per the writ affidavit, are that the Workman joined the petitioner-Bank as sub-staff in 1974 and was promoted to clerical cadre in 1981. He was on unauthorized absence for more than 90 days and therefore invoking Clause 17 of Bipartite Settlement dated 10.04.1989, a notice was served on the Workman on 30.07.1993 advising to report to duty within 30 days. As there was no response, the Workman was deemed to have voluntarily retired from service of the Bank with effect from 30.08.1993 and a communication to that effect was sent on 10.09.1993. It is stated that previously he was charge sheeted on 18.10.1989 for unauthorized absence from 05.04.1989 to 19.08.1989 for a period of 108 days. And again charge sheeted on 29.02.1992 for unauthorized absence from 22.04.1991 till 29.02.1992 and imposed minor penalty. Yet again he was charge sheeted on 23.07.1992 for unauthorized absence from 18.05.1992 to 23.07.1992 and a minor penalty was imposed. Further again on 23.10.1992, he was charge sheeted for unauthorized absence from 24.08.1992 to 23.10.1992 and a minor penalty of warning orders 22.12.1992 were issued. Thereafter, once again the Workman was continuously on unauthorized absence since 15.11.1992. In view of the frequent unauthorized absence, the petitioner- Bank deemed the Workman as not interested in the employment, a notice under Clause 17 of Bipartite Settlement dated 10.04.1989 was issued by the competent authority advising to report to duty within 30 days and the notice was delivered to the residential address of the Workman on 03.08.1993 and as there was no response, a final notice was sent to the |Workman on 10.09.1993 informing him that as he failed to respond to the Bank notice dated 30.07.1993, the Workman was treated to have voluntarily retired from service with effect from 30.08.1993.

The Workman approached the Labour Court by filing LCID No.264 of

2001. The Labour Court passed the impugned Award. Challenging the same, the petitioner-Bank filed this writ petition.

3. Heard Dr. K. Lakshmi Narasimha, Standing Counsel appearing for the petitioner-Bank; and Mr. Gadi Praveen Kumar, learned Deputy Solicitor General for respondent No.1, and Mr. Sujith Jaiswal, learned counsel for respondent No.2-Workman.

4. Learned Standing Counsel for petitioner-Bank would submit that respondent No.2-Workman is a habitual absentee and has been charge sheeted umpteen times for his unauthorized absence and was imposed minor penalties and warning orders were also issued. Learned Standing Counsel would submit that in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syndicate Bank v. The General Secretary, Syndicate bank Staff Association1, it is not necessary for the Bank to hold an enquiry in case of invocation of Clause 16 of Bipartite Settlement dated 17.09.1984, which is a similar clause in vogue prior to Bipartite Settlement dated 10.04.1989 and that principles of natural justice are inbuilt in Clause 16 of Bipartite Settlement. It is also argued that the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.K. Yadav v. M/s JMA Industries Ltd2is not applicable and therefore the Labour Court erred in passing the impugned Award.

5. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent-Workman would contend that the petitioner-Bank failed to honour the impugned Award within 30 days as directed by the Labour Court and the petitioner-Bank failed to pay the wages under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel would also submit that the petitioner-Bank may be directed to pay wages as per Section 17B of the Act from 06.12.2004 to 30.06.2016 which is the period commencing from granting of stay by this Court till the petitioner attains age of superannuation, and that there is no meri

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