JUDGMENT:

This Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, ‘the Code’) by the unsuccessful defendant is directed against the decree and judgment dated 31.08.2007 passed in A.S.No.607 of 2004 by the learned X Additional Chief Judge, (Judge, Fast Track Court), City Civil Court, Hyderabad, whereby the learned Additional Chief Judge while dismissing the said appeal had confirmed the decree and judgment dated 06.11.2004 of the learned II Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad passed in O.S.No.603 of 2001 filed by the sole plaintiff/respondent for eviction of the defendant/appellant from the Mulgi bearing Municipal No.6-3-668/12 & 13, situated at Punjagutta Main Road, Hyderabad more fully described in the schedule annexed to the plaint.

2. I have heard the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the appellant/defendant (‘the defendant’, for brevity) and the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff (‘the plaintiff’, for brevity). I have perused the material record.

3. When this Second Appeal was admitted on 16.11.2007, the following substantial questions of law were framed.

1) Whether the suit for eviction can be decreed without plaintiff entering the witness box?

2) Whether the alleged GPA of the plaintiff can depose on behalf of the plaintiff for the acts done by her?

3) Whether the Court can consider a person to sign different signatures at different points of time?

4) Whether the Court can still draw presumption under Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act as to the execution, attestation and authentication by the public notary of a foreign country when the signature of the GPA apparently differs from the signature of the executant with that of the admitted signature?

5) Whether the Court can draw a presumption under Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act as to the attestation and authentication of the said document without there being reference in the document itself and when a provision of the document is deleted?

On the above substantial questions of law which were formulated, the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the defendant and the learned counsel for the plaintiff were heard.

5. To adjudicate the lis and answer the substantial questions of law, it is necessary to state, in brief, the admitted facts and the pleadings of both the sides, which are relevant:

6. Admitted and undisputed facts: “The plaintiff, Sofia Hasan, is the landlady and the owner of the suit schedule property. The defendant is a tenant in occupation of the said schedule mulgi of the plaintiff. He is carrying on his business under the name and style ‘PIKNIC BAKERY’ in the said mulgi. The notice dated 08.12.2000 terminating the tenancy as per the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served on the defendant. Thereafter, the suit was brought for eviction and for recovery of arrears of rent @ Rs.1,440/- per month from 01.06.2000 to 30.12.2000 and for mesne profits @ Rs.3,000/- per month from January, 2001 till the date of delivery of possession, as the defendant had failed to comply with the demands made in the quit notice.”

7. The suit was brought by the plaintiff represented by her General Power of Attorney holder – Zulfekar Alam as she is stated to be a resident of Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.

8. The defendant having filed a written statement resisted the suit, inter alia, contending as follows: ‘The landlady never instructed the defendant to pay the rents to her said agent Zulfequar Alam (hereinafter referred to as ‘agent’ for short). The so called agent has no authority to issue the quit notice and, as such, the termination of tenancy by him does not arise and there is no valid termination of the lease. When the said agent had demanded for payment of rents to him, the defendant had demanded him to produce a document showing his authority to demand and collect rents from the defendant; and on that there was a threat of forceful dispossession of the defendant from the schedule mulgi; and,