2024 Supreme(Online)(Tel) 37621
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD
K. SUJANA, J
Fatima Begum Fathima Bee – Appellant
Versus
The State of Telangana – Respondent
CRLP/10939/2024
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA I.A.Nos.2 and 3 of 2024 In/And CRIMINAL PETITION No.10939 of 2024
ORDER:
This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) to quash the proceedings against the petitioners in S.C.No.673 of 2024 on the file of Special Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court for Atrocities against Women(2), Hyderabad, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 376 (2) (n), 374, 312, 370, 370A and read with 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘I.P.C.’)
2. Heard Sri Mahmood Khan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners as well as Sri D. Arun Kumar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of respondent No.1-State.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner/de facto complainant filed Interlocutory Applications, vide I.A.Nos.2 and 3 of 2024, in the present criminal petition to permit the petitioners and respondent No.2 to compound the offences and to record the compromise, therefore, he prayed the Court to quash the proceedings against the petitioners in S.C.No.673 of 2024, as the matter has been settled amicably.
4. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court in Major Amrit Yadav vs.
State of Telangana1, wherein in paragraph Nos.10, 11 and 12 are held as follows:
“10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shambhu Kharwar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh held as under:
“13. In this backdrop and taking the allegations in the complaint as they stand, it is impossible to find in the FIR or in the charge sheet, the essential ingredients of an offence under IPC. The crucial issue which is to be considered is whether the allegations indicate that the appellant had given a promise to the second respondent to marry which is at the inception was false and on the basis of which the second respondent was induced into a sexual relationship. Taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offence under IPC are absent. The relationship between the parties was purely of a consensual nature. The relationship, as noted above, was in existence to subsist during the term of the marriage and after the second respondent was granted a divorce by mutual consent.”
11. A bare reading of the complaint would indicate that the 2nd respondent had sexual relation over a period of four years with this petitioner consensually. In the said circumstances, when the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant is not willing to prosecute the case against the petitioner in the Court, the proceedings would only result in wastage of trial Court’s time. Both on facts when the allegations did not make out any offence of rape or cheating and also when the parties are inclined to compromise the matter, only for the reason there being mention of rape in the charge sheet and the parties have compromised, intervention of this Court under inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., cannot be denied.
12. Considering the said report of the Secretary, Telangana High Court Legal Services Committee, Hyderabad, and in view of the compromise entered between the petitioner
and respondent No.2, I.A.Nos.2 and 3 of 2022 are allowed. Consequently, the criminal petition is allowed and the proceedings in P.R.C.No.74 of 2022 on the file of the XXII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Secunderabad, are hereby quashed against the petitioner/accused.”
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kapil Gupta vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another, [(2022) 15 Supreme Court Cases 44], wherein in paragaraph No.16 it is held as under:
“16. In that view of the matter, we find that though in a heinous or serious crime like rape, the Court should not normally exercise the powers of quashing the proceedings, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case