THE HON’BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.3775 OF 2025

ORDER:

1. The petitioner is the defendant No.4 before the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at Rajendranagar (‘Trial Court’) in a Suit vide O.S.No.38 of 2024 filed by the respondent No.1/plaintiff for perpetual injunction. The petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order dated 28.07.2025 passed by the Trial Court dismissing the I.A.No.209 of 2025 in O.S.No.38 of 2024. The I.A. was filed by the petitioner/defendant No.4 for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’) on the grounds that the plaint did not disclose a ‘cause of action’ and was also barred by law as the respondent No.1/plaintiff was attempting to obtain an injunction based on a defective title.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/defendant No.4 submits that section 41 (j) of The Specific Relief Act, 1963, which provides that an injunction cannot be granted when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter, constitutes the ‘barred-by-law’ component under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the CPC. Learned counsel, however, places greater emphasis on the absence of a ‘cause of action’ in the plaint.

submits that the respondent No.1/plaintiff does not possess a Sale Deed in its favour and only has a registered Agreement of Sale cum General Power of Attorney (Doc.No.4092 of 2007) with the vendor in respect of the suit schedule property. Learned counsel further submits that the respondent No.1/plaintiff’s vendor i.e., the respondent No.2 had entered into an Agreement of Sale with the original owner of the suit schedule property, whereby a decree for specific performance was obtained in its favour. Hence, the Trial Court failed to note that the respondent No.1/plaintiff could not have maintained the Suit due to lack of ‘cause of action’ since the respondent No.1/plaintiff cannot claim ownership based solely on an Agreement of Sale-cum-GPA with the vendor when the vendor only possesses a decree for specific performance which unlike a Sale Deed, does not by itself confer title.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1/plaintiff has also made his submissions.

5. The reasons given by the Trial Court in dismissing the I.A filed by the petitioner/defendant No.4 for rejection of the plaint are contained in Paragraph No.10 of the impugned order. The Trial Court therein found that the petitioner/defendant No.4’s act of disputing the respondent No.1/plaintiff’s title to the suit schedule property amounts to an interference with the said property, which constituted a valid cause of action. This Court does not find any error in this reasoning. Moreover, Paragraph Nos.14 and 15 of the impugned order further record that the contention of the petitioner/defendant No.4 that the plaintiff’s vendor i.e., the respondent No.2 only has a decree in its favour and not a registered Sale Deed in its favour so as to constitute a valid title which can be passed on to the respondent No.1/plaintiff, are questions of fact which should be adjudicated only during the course of a Trial. The other contention of the petitioner/defendant No.4 that the respondent No.1/plaintiff has never been in possession of the suit schedule property was also accepted as a fact, which could not be decided in a summary proceeding, such as under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.

6. This Court agrees with the reasons given by the Trial Court since the contentions of the petitioner involve disputed questions of fact pertaining to the plaintiff’s title to the suit schedule property and as to whether the decree in favour of the plaintiff’s vendor would translate into a right in favour of the plaintiff to file a Suit. These are not matters which can be decided in proceedings initiated under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of a plaint where the averments made in the plaint are the only grounds to be considered by the Court to arrive at a conc