THE HON’BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA AND THE HON’BLE JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR I.A.No.1 OF 2024 IN/AND FAMILY COURT APPEAL NO.121 OF 2024 Mrs.Kavitha Bagelikkar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant.

Mr.Aadesh Verma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.

COMMON JUDGMENT: (Per Hon’ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya)

1. The appellant prays for condonation of delay of 240 days in filing the present Family Court Appeal against the impugned order dated 24.05.2023.

2. Section 19 (3) of The Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short, ‘the 1984 Act’) mandates that every appeal from a judgment or order of a Family Court to the High Court shall be filed within thirty (30) days from the date of judgment or order of the learned Family Court. In the present case, by the impugned order, the petition filed by the respondent (the petitioner in the Trial Court is the respondent herein) under section 13 (1) (ia) and (ib) of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of his marriage with the appellant ( the respondent in the Trial Court is the appellant herein) was allowed. The learned Family Court accordingly dissolved the marriage of the parties.

3. We have carefully perused I.A.No.1 of 2024 which has been filed by the appellant for condonation of delay of 240 days. We are surprised to find that the affidavit to the I.A. consists of seven paragraphs in all. However, none of the paragraphs mention even a single date including the date on which the appellant received summons or any pleading with regard to the delay in filing of the appeal pursuant to the impugned order dated 24.05.2023. The only averments made is the bare denial of the appellant of not having refused any service of summons and that the appellant went to her maternal home to spend some time when the respondent with dishonest intention, obtained the decree of divorce from the Trial Court. The appellant further states that the delay in filing this appeal is not willful and that she was not aware of the impugned ‘Court Orders’.

4. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant and learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the issue of delay.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent in his Counter affidavit places a report of the Trial Court which states that although the appellant was present, and was shown the notice copy and was explained its context, the appellant refused to take notice copy.

6. Apart from the above fact, we found at paragraph No.3 of the impugned order that since the Court notice to the appellant was returned as ‘refused’, the appellant was set ex parte on 04.04.2023. Section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘the 1963 Act’) allows admission of appeals or applications beyond the prescribed period of time subject to the applicant/appellant showing sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the Court to explain filing of the appeals/applications beyond the prescribed time period. Section 5 of the 1963 Act is a matter of discretion where the Court exercises its discretion with respect to condonation of delay to allow or reject an application/appeal filed after the limitation period.

7. In the present case, the affidavit to the I.A. does not state a single reason for condonation of delay. The affidavit does not mention any date or any ground to show the bona fides of the appellant or any sincere effort on the part of the appellant to account for the delay of 240 days.

8. We hence do not find any reason to allow the present I.A. I.A.No.1 of 2024 is accordingly dismissed.

9. Consequently, F.C.A.No.121 of 2024, along with all connected applications, is accordingly dismissed in terms of the above. There shall be no order as to costs.

__________________________________ MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J _____________________________

GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR, J DATE: 08.09.2025 EDS