THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.M. MOHIUDDIN M.A.C.M.A.No.500 of 2020

JUDGMENT:

Heard Sri Kuldeep Jadhav, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri T.Mahender Rao, learned Standing Counsel for respondent No.4-Insurance Company and perused the record.

2. The present appeal is filed by the appellant/claimant aggrieved by the order dated 17.07.2020 passed in M.V.O.P.No.533 of 2014 by the learned Chairman, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-Additional District Judge at Nizamabad (for short, ‘the Tribunal’) in allowing the petition in part granting Rs.1,36,500/- towards compensation with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till the date of realisation as against the total compensation of Rs.6,00,000/- claimed for the injuries, loss of future earnings, pain and suffering and medical expenses of the appellant.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the amount awarded by the Tribunal is inadequate and the order in refusing to grant compensation in the quantum as prayed for, is illegal and arbitrary. Learned counsel further contended that the Tribunal ought to have awarded Rs.2,00,000/- towards amputation of two toes and Rs.1,00,000/- towards dislocation of the toe fingers. Learned counsel further contended that the Tribunal ought to have awarded Rs.1,00,000/- towards pain and suffering, Rs.1,00,000/- towards medical expenses, Rs.50,000/- towards nourishment and Rs.75,000/- towards loss of amenities. Learned counsel further contended that the Tribunal ought to have awarded interest @ 15% per annum and not @ 7.5% per annum as awarded by the Tribunal.

4. The core issue involved in the present appeal is that the application of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short, ‘M.V.Act’) vis-à-vis Section 166 of the M.V. Act. The Tribunal correctly identified that the claim under Section 163-A of the M.V. Act is based on ‘no fault liability’. The appellant’s strategy to amend the claim from Section 166 of the M.V. Act to Section 163-A of the M.V. Act (‘no fault liability’) is crucial inasmuch as it simplifies the burden of proof of the claimant and by the said amendment, the respondents (especially the insurance company’s) defences based on the negligence of the driver were rendered irrelevant.

5. The relevant Section 163-A of the M.V. Act mandates that compensation be awarded as per the structured formula provided in the Second Schedule of the M.V. Act. The Tribunal rightly acknowledged that Courts can deviate from the Second Schedule of the M.V. Act in appropriate cases to ensure just and fair compensation as held in the case of Prahallad Rathod v. K.Vittal, (2017) 3 ALD 472. This Court finds that the amounts awarded under each head are commensurate to the severity of the injury and do not warrant any interference by this Court.

6. This Court is of the opinion that the Tribunal rightly awarded amounts under the head of grievous injury and loss of amenities which adequately compensate functional disability of the appellant; and the impact the injuries would have on her future earning capacity. The grant of interest @ 7.5% per annum is just and reasonable, and further no compelling reasons are cited on behalf of the appellant to justify the rate of interest @ 15% per annum as sought in the present appeal. Thus, the Tribunal applied the principle of ‘no fault liability’ and awarded just and reasonable compensation. The Tribunal’s quantification under various heads was liberal.

7. In view of the above, no legal foundation is made out in the case warranting interference with the quantum of compensation or the rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal.

The appeal fails being devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed.

8. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed.

_____________________ G.M. MOHIUDDIN, J Date: 02.09.2025 ssp