THE HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL AND THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE RENUKA YARA WRIT PETITION No.9847 of 2025 ORDER: (Per the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice Sujoy Paul)

Sri Praveen K Nair, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Dominic Fernandes, learned Standing Counsel for CBIC, for respondent Nos.1 and 2.

2. Heard on admission.

3. This writ petition assails the Order-in-Original dated 22.12.2023.

4. The present writ petition is filed on 28.03.2025.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Form GST DRC-

07 dated 16.05.2024 is an unsigned document.

6. On a specific query from the Bench regarding the delay in assailing the order dated 22.12.2023, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention only to paragraph No.6 of the writ affidavit. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not explained the delay in assailing the order dated 22.12.2023 after considerable long time. The petitioner had a remedy of appeal against the Order-in-Original dated 22.12.2023 within a period of ninety days. The Apex Court in Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited, (2020) 19 SCC 681 in paragraph No.19 opined as under:-

“19. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. [Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 21 : (2018) 361 ELT 22] , which had adopted the view taken by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Panoli Intermediate (India) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [Panoli Intermediate (India) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, 2015 SCC OnLine Guj 570 : AIR 2015 Guj 97] and also of the Karnataka High Court in Phoenix Plasts Co. v. CCE [Phoenix Plasts Co. v. CCE, 2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10432 : (2013) 298 ELT 481] . The logic applied in these decisions proceeds on fallacious premise. For, these decisions are premised on the logic that provision such as Section 31 of the 2005 Act, cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. This approach is faulty. It is not a matter of taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court. In a given case, the assessee may approach the High Court before the statutory period of appeal expires to challenge the assessment order by way of writ petition on the ground that the same is without jurisdiction or passed in excess of jurisdiction — by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction including in flagrant disregard of law and rules of procedure or in violation of principles of natural justice, where no procedure is specified. The High Court may accede to such a challenge and can also non-suit the petitioner on the ground that alternative efficacious remedy is available and that be invoked by the writ petitioner. However, if the writ petitioner chooses to approach the High Court after expiry of the maximum limitation period of 60 days prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act, the High Court cannot disregard the statutory period for redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such a party as a matter of course. Doing so would be in the teeth of the principle underlying the dictum of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in ONGC [ONGC v. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corpn. Ltd. (2017) 5 SCC 42 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 47] In other words, the fact that the High Court has wide powers, does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act. That would

render the legislative scheme and intention behind the stated provision otiose.”

(Emphasis supplied)

7. In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court, the petitioner could have filed the writ petition within the statutory period of limitation for filing the petition. The petition is filed with sufficient amount of delay and without there being any explanation for delay. For this reason alone, we are not inclined to i