THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA

ORDER:

The case at hand, precisely, is that the petitioner who was a Police Constable in the then Andhra Pradesh Special Police, appointed vide Proceedings dated 12.12.1985, was dismissed from service by Order dated 20.10.1998 passed by the 3rd respondent-Commandant, Telangana Special Police Battalion, Kondapur, in the departmental proceedings initiated on the basis of allegations against him for the offence under Section 376 IPC. However, in the judicial proceedings in Sessions Case No.419 of 1998 on the file of Assistant Sessions Judge, Asifabad, the petitioner was acquitted of the charges, by Judgment dated 25.01.2000. Consequent to his acquittal in the Sessions Case, the petitioner filed an appeal before the 2nd respondent-Deputy Inspector General of Police, and the same was dismissed on 29.06.2000. He therefore filed this writ petition challenging his dismissal order dated 20.10.1998, and the subsequent appeal order dated 29.06.2000, contending that he was acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge after due trial, and the respondent authorities have not considered the factum of acquittal, and further the authorities have not conducted the enquiry as per due procedure of law, and the alleged victim (named Devi Karmakar) was not examined, and no witnesses were examined and therefore the impugned order of dismissal from service is illegal and arbitrary.

2. Heard Mr.G.Alla Bakash, learned counsel for the petitioner; and learned Government Pleader for Home (Service).

Perused the record.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner made submissions on the lines of writ affidavit. He relies on the G.M.Tank vs. State of Gujarat1, and Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Girja Shankar Pant, (2001) 1 SCC 182, and Kulwant Singh Gill vs. State of Punjab, (1991) SCC Suppl (1) 504 He also relies on the Order of this Court in Writ Petition (TR)

No.3639 of 2017, dated 25.01.2024.

4. Learned Government Pleader, based on the counter affidavit, would essentially contend that disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings stand on different footing; and further the petitioner has not availed the statutory remedy of revision, against the appellate authority’s order dated 29.06.2000 and

1 (2006) 5 SCC 446

straight away approached this Court after a huge delay of 18 years, and therefore the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

5. Having considered the respective submissions and perused the record, it may be noted that it is not in dispute that the petitioner was dismissed from service in the year 1998 based on the departmental enquiry into the allegations against him for the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC, and the appeal petition was also dismissed by the appellate authority in the year 2000. This writ petition is filed in the year 2018 challenging the dismissal order passed in the year 1998 (and the appeal order passed in the year 2000). There is a huge, unexplained delay of 18 years in approaching this Court. The petitioner, in his reply affidavit, pleads that he met with an accident and became paralytic and was under medical care from 10.02.2000 to 17.10.2017. This Court, at this distance of time, is not inclined to venture into the truth or otherwise of the pleading put forth by the petitioner, as the illness or accident itself does not disable the petitioner, for about 18 years, from approaching this Court, or availing statutory review remedy. Furthermore, nothing prevented the petitioner to bring the alleged factum of accident/paralytic condition to the notice of appellate authority/reviewing authority of the Department at the initial stages of occurrence of accident.

6. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal Nos.1660 of 2018 and 593 of 2016, wherein the Division Bench, by referring to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kulwant Singh (supra) observed as follows:

“The delay of 5 to 18 years was held to be inordinate d