THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE RENUKA YARA C.R.P.No.4025 of 2024

ORDER:

Heard Sri Ramesh Chandra Soni, learned counsel for the revision petitioner. Despite service of notice, none appeared on behalf of the respondents.

2. The Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioner against the impugned order dated 19.11.2024 passed in I.A. No. 808 of 2024 in M.A.(SR) No. 1749 of 2024 by the learned Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad. By the impugned order, the petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking to condone the delay of 498 days in preferring the appeal, was dismissed by the trial Court.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that instead of filing the appeal, the petitioner inadvertently filed the Writ Petition which was dismissed as withdrawn on 09.08.2024 with liberty to prefer the same before the First Appellate Court. He further submitted that the appeal is filed within the period of limitation when the time spent for prosecuting the said writ petition before this Court is excluded. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Purni Devi & Anr. Vs Babu Ram & Anr, (2024) 4 SCR 37, and prayed the Court to allow the revision petition.

4. In case of Purni Devi (supra), the Apex Court held as follows:

“30. The principles pertaining to applicability of Section 14, were extensively discussed and summarised by this Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises (Supra), wherein while holding the exclusion of time period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act to a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act it was observed:-

“21. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. On analysis of the said section, it becomes evident that the following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be pressed into service:

(1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party;

(2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith;

(3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature;

(4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue; and (5) Both the proceedings are in a court.”

34. The judgment of this Court in M.P. Steel (Supra) discussed the phrases, “due diligence” and “in good faith” for the purposes of invocation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. While considering the application of Section 14 to the Customs Act, it was observed:

“10. We might also point out that Conditions 1 to 4 mentioned in the Consolidated Engg. case [(2008) 7 SCC 169] have, in fact, been met by the Plaintiff. It is clear that both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party. The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith, as has been explained in Consolidated Engg. [(2008) 7 SCC 169] itself. These phrases only mean that the party who invokes Section 14 should not be guilty of negligence, lapse or inaction. Further, there should be no pretended mistake intentionally made with a view to delaying the proceedings or harassing the opposite party.

49. ……. the expression “the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding” needs to be construed in a manner which advances the object sought to be achieved, thereby advancing the cause of justice.”

5. In the present case, the appeal was preferred in time when the time spent on prosecuting the said Writ Petition is excluded. Hence, this Court, having in the light of aforementioned decision of the Apex Court, instead of considering the matter in a narrow compass on technicalities, deems it fit and proper to direct the First Appellate Court to register the appeal.

6. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 19.11.2024 in I.A. No. 808 of 202