The expression "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be interpreted liberally and pragmatically to ensure substantial justice, prioritizing the adjudication of merits over technicalities, especially when delays are caused by genuine medical complications and are not mala fide.

ORDER

This Civil Revision Petition is preferred by the petitioner aggrieved by the order dated 05.02.2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the impugned order”) passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy District in I. A. No. 693 of 2008 in CMA SR No.2498 of 2008. By the impugned order, the appellate Court dismissed the interlocutory application on the ground that the abnormal delay of 695 days had not been satisfactorily explained.

BRIEF FACTS

2. The factual backdrop to the present revision is as follows:

a) The petitioner/plaintiff instituted O.S. No.111 of 1995 for specific performance in respect of subject property on the file of the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District. The said suit was dismissed for default by order dated 02.11.2000. Thereafter, the petitioner filed I.A. No.13 of 2001 under Order IX Rule 9 of the CPC seeking restoration of the suit, which was dismissed by order dated 17.10.2005. The certified copy of the said order was furnished on 02.03.2006. Subsequently, the petitioner sought to prefer C.M.A. Sr. No.2498 of 2008 against the order in I.A. No.13 of 2001, along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 695 days. By the impugned order, the appellate Court dismissed the said application holding that the delay had not been satisfactorily explained. Aggrieved thereby the present Civil Revision Petition came to be filed.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order passed by the appellate Court is contrary to law, the probabilities of the case, and the settled principles of natural justice. It is submitted that the petitioner had instituted a suit for specific performance, which was dismissed for default on 02.11.2000. Thereafter, an application for restoration of the suit was filed within the prescribed time. However, the same was dismissed on 17.10.2005. Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the petitioner preferred an appeal along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of 695 days in filing the appeal.

4. It is further contended that the petitioner had undergone a major surgery in February, 2002 and, owing to post-operative complications, the petitioner was advised complete rest for a period of two years from 10.08.2005, due to which he could not take timely steps to prefer the appeal. It is argued that the delay was neither wilful nor deliberate. Therefore, the appellate Court ought to have condoned the delay, particularly when the matter arises out of a suit for specific performance involving rights of the petitioner.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthya , AIR 1998 SC 3222 and Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji , (1987) 2 SCC 107 wherein it was held that refusal to condone delay would result in shutting out a litigant from placing his case on merits. It was further held that there is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate, and that the expression “sufficient cause” occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act m