A second petition for quashing criminal proceedings is not maintainable if it is based on grounds available during the first petition, as this constitutes an abuse of the process of law and an impermissible review of the previous order.

ORDER

This Criminal Petition has been filed seeking to quash the proceedings in Crime No.42 of 2024, on the file of the Nagarkurnool Police Station, Nagarkurnool District, wherein the petitioner was arrayed as accused No.1 for the offences punishable under Sections 409, 420 and 468 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, (for short ‘IPC’).

2. Heard Mr. Sanjeev Reddy Gillella, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. Jithender Rao Veeramalla, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has not committed any offences and he was falsely implicated in the present crime. Even according to the allegations levelled in the complaint, the ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 409, 420 and 468 read with 34 of the IPC are not attracted against the petitioner and the crime was registered long back on 25.01.2024 and the Investigating Officer, after conducting investigation, filed final report two years and three months ago. Hence, the continuation of proceedings against the petitioner is a clear abuse of the process of law. In support of his contention, he relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar in Crl.Appeal No.138 of 2009, dated 23.01.2009, wherein it was held as follows:

“16. Tested on the touchstone of the broad principles enumerated above, we are convinced that in the present case appellant's constitutional right recognised under Article 21 of the Constitution stands violated. It is manifest from the facts narrated above that in the first instance investigations were conducted by an officer, who had no jurisdiction to do so and the appellant cannot be accused of delaying the trial merely because he successfully exercised his right to challenge an illegal investigation. Be that as it may, admittedly the High Court vide its order dated 7th September, 1990 had directed the prosecution to complete the investigation within a period of three months from the date of the said order but nothing happened till 27th February, 2007 when, after receipt of notice in the second petition preferred by the appellant complaining about delay in investigation, the Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarpur directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police to complete the investigation. It was only thereafter that a fresh chargesheet is stated to have been filed on 1st May, 2007. It is also pertinent to note that even till date, learned counsel for the State is not sure whether a sanction for prosecuting the appellant is required and if so, whether it has been granted or not. We have no hesitation in holding that at least for the period from 7th December, 1990 till 28th February, 2007 there is no explanation whatsoever for the delay in investigation. Even the direction issued by the High Court seems to have had no effect on the prosecution and they slept over the matter for almost seventeen years. Nothing could be pointed out by the State, far from being established to show that the delay in investigation or trial was in any way attributable to the appellant. The prosecution has failed to show any exceptional circumstance which could possibly be taken into consideration for condoning a callous and inordinate delay of more than two decades in investigations and the trial. The said delay cannot, in any way, be said to be arising from any default on the part of the appellant. Thus, on facts in hand, in our opinion, the stated delay clearly violates the constitutional gu