A writ petition is premature and generally not maintainable under Article 226 when statutory disciplinary proceedings are still ongoing and a specific alternative remedy of appeal is available, unless there is a clear violation of fundamental rights or natural justice.

ORDER:

The petitioner is a Chartered Accountant. He was engaged by respondent No. 5 and other directors of Parthasarthi Art Printers Pvt. Ltd. to provide advisory and compliance-related services. The dispute arose when respondent No. 5 (a Director of Parthasarthi Art Printers Pvt. Ltd.), by way of a complaint dated 11.11.2017 addressed to the disciplinary authority (respondent No. 4), alleged that the petitioner had, with mala fide intent, orchestrated his removal as a Director of the company, and facilitated the appointment of additional directors, and also filed Form DIR-12 with the Registrar of Companies in violation of the Companies Act, 2013.

1.1. Following the complaint, a notice was issued to the petitioner, and disciplinary proceedings were initiated under Ref. No. PR/347/18/DD-42/18. The petitioner submitted his written defense along with supporting documents. He states that although the disciplinary authority sought additional information from both him and the complainant, respondent No. 5 failed to respond to any such communications or furnish relevant material after filing the initial complaint. Despite this, the disciplinary authority proceeded to form a prima facie opinion on 02.06.2021 without adequately considering the record or applying its mind. He further emphasizes that the complaint itself was defective at inception, as in Form-1, under column 5, the complainant merely cited “Section 448 of the Companies Act, 2013” instead of specifying the relevant clauses under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949. According to the petitioner, this defect required the complaint to be returned for rectification under Rule 5(3) of the 2007 Rules, failing which it ought to have been closed. Instead, the authority allegedly proceeded in disregard of mandatory procedure.

1.2. The petitioner further narrates that the prima facie opinion not only identified the applicable schedules but went beyond its limited scope by recording categorical findings of guilt. He references specific portions of the opinion, including observations that the material “clearly establish” lack of diligence, that certain documents “seem to be an afterthought and forged,” and that he acted “in connivance…to suit his ill-designs,” to argue that the authority engaged in an adjudicatory exercise rather than a preliminary assessment as contemplated under Rule 9(1). He contends that such findings effectively prejudiced the subsequent stages of inquiry by influencing respondents No. 2 and 3, who form part of the same institutional framework.

1.3. Thereafter, a notice was issued by respondent No.3 informing the petitioner that the prima facie opinion had been concurred with and directing him to submit a written statement within 14 days. The petitioner asserts that this communication lacked reasons for concurrence, thereby violating principles of natural justice and rendering any further response an “empty formality,” particularly because the disciplinary committee and the investigative directorate operate within the same statutory scheme under Sections 21 and 21B of the Act. In an effort to challenge the process, the petitioner submitted representations on 19.10.2021, 15.11.2021, and 24.01.2022, urging the authorities not to proceed arbitrarily; however, his representations were allegedly ignored.

1.4. The petitioner asserts that the disciplinary authority improperly relied on extraneous considerations beyond the complaint, written statement, and supporting documents, and exce