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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD
Suddala Chalapathi Rao, J
Madrasa-I-Aizza Society – Appellant
Versus
Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation – Respondent
WRIT PETITION No.10993 of 2016
For the Appellants/Petitioners: Sai Ram Kanakamedala, Tarun G. Reddy
For the Respondents: Balu Dudekula, Raparthi Venkatesh
Educational institutions imparting education are not engaged in trade or commerce and therefore cannot be required to obtain a trade license.
Headnote:The petitioners, a society and its minority educational institution, challenged a notice issued by the municipal corporation requiring them to obtain a trade license. The petitioners contended that as an institution imparting education, they are not engaged in trade or commerce. The court found that the institution's primary object is to promote education, which is a non-commercial activity. The central issue is whether an educational institution can be compelled to obtain a trade license. Relying on the principle that "imparting education cannot be treated as a trade or business" and that education is a "religious and charitable activity," the court reasoned that the requirement of a trade license is inapplicable to such institutions. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and the impugned notice dated 31.03.2016 is hereby set-aside.
ORDER
This Writ Petition is filed seeking the following reliefs:
“...to issue any appropriate writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the 1st respondent in insisting on the requirement of a trade license for running of the 2nd petitioner institution including by issuing notice dated 31.03.2016 as arbitrary, illegal, unconstitutional and in violation of the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court and consequently, to set aside the notice dated 31.03.2016 issued by the 1st respondent and direct the 1st respondent not to insist on the requirement of a trade license for running of the 2nd petitioner institution...”
Heard Mr.Sai Ram Kanakamedala, learned counsel representing Mr.Tarun G.Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Mr.Balu Dudekula, learned counsel representing Mr.Raparthi Venkatesh, learned Standing Counsel for GHMC appearing for respondent No.1. Perused the record.
The brief facts of the case are that the 1st petitioner is a Society formed with the objective of providing educational facilities to the members of the Muslim Community and that the 2nd petitioner-School was established in the year 2009, which is a minority institution and they have been running the said school from several years, and the 1st respondent has issued the impugned notice, dated 31.03.2016, directing the petitioners to obtain a Trade License.
It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that in fact, it is a School, which has been imparting education for the students and that the School is not dealing with any trade or commerce and the question of directing the petitioner-School to obtain Trade License does arise. In support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Unni Krishnan, J.P. vs State of A.P. , (1993) 1 SCC 645 wherein, it was specifically held that educational institutions imparting education does not come under the purview of obtaining any Trade License.
Per contra, learned Standing Counsel for respondent No.1 contended that though the petitioners are running a School imparting education, they have to obtain a Trade License and accordingly, issued to notice, to which the petitioners can file their explanation.
Heard learned counsel for the petitioners as well as learned Standing Counsel for respondent No.1. Evidently, the petitioners are running a School for many years by obtaining appropriate permission from the Department of School Education and it is a primary School being run from many years for the benefit of children promoting education.
In Unni Krishanan’s case cited supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:
“...that the right guaranteed the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) has been elaborately discussed by the five-Judge Constitution Bench. The Court held that imparting education cannot be treated as a trade or business. Trade or business normally connotes an activity carried on with a profit motive. This Court observed that education has never been nor can it be allowed to become commerce in this Country. Education has always been treated, in this Country, as a religious and charitable activity and making it commercial is opposed to the ethos, tradition and sensibilities of this nation. A citizen of this Country may have a right to establish an educational institution but no citizen, person or institution has a right much less of fundamental right to affiliation or recognition. Their Lordships observed: (Unni Krishnan case3, SCC pp. 688 & 691, paras 67, 67a & 72)
67. Even on general principles, the matter could be approached this way. Educational institutions can be classified under two categories:
1. Those requiring recognition by the State and
2. Those who do not require such a recognition.
67a. It is not merely an establishment of educational institution, that is urged by the petitioners, but, to run the educational institution dependent on recognition by t