I N THE HI GH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAI NI TAL HON’BLE THE CHI EF JUSTI CE SRI G. NARENDAR AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTI CE ALOK MAHRA ^TH WRI T PETI TI ON ( M/ B) No. 316 OF 2025 M/s Sri Sai Vishwas Polymers.

…Petitioner Versus Deputy Commissioner and another.

…Respondents Counsel for the petitioner. : Mr. Akash Verma and Mr. Deepak Kumar Tamta, learned counsels.

Counsel for the respondents. : Ms. Puja Banga, learned Brief Holder for the State of Uttarakhand.

JUDGMENT : (per Sri G. Narendar, C.J.)

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Brief Holder for the State of Uttarakhand.

2. The short point, that is canvassed before this Court is that the Assessing Officer has passed the order of assessment in violation of the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 75 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (for short “CGST Act”). Section 75 of the CGST Act deals with the general provisions relating to determination of tax, and the procedure that is required to be adopted by the Assessing Authority, while completing the process of assessment. One such pre-requisite is that the Assessing Authority is required to afford an opportunity of personal hearing, where it is requested by the Assessee in writing, or where any adverse decision is contemplated against such person, meaning thereby that the Assessing Authority is required to comply with the mandate of sub-section (4) of Section 75 in either of the two circumstances, i.e. where a request for personal hearing is made and specifically sought for in writing, or where an adverse decision is contemplated against such person.

3. In the instant case, the Assessing Officer has drawn conclusions adverse to the interest of the petitioner, and that being the undisputed fact, the Assessing Authority was required to afford an opportunity of personal hearing, even in the absence of a written request. It is needless to say that, when the law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, the said act shall be performed in the said manner alone, or not at all. Law in this regard is no more res integra, and is well-settled by catena of judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court. A similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of I ndependent Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Girish Sriram Juneja & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 6071 of 2023 dated 29.01.2025. Paragraph nos. 54 & 83 of the said judgment reads as follows:

“54. In the present interpretive exercise, one also needs to be mindful of the legal principle which says that where a statute requires one to do a certain thing in a certain manner, it must be done in that particular manner or not done at all. For this proposition, it would be relevant to extract the following from the judgment in A. R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500:

“22…….. It is unnecessary to refer to the long line of decisions commencing from Taylor v. Taylor [(1876) 1 Ch D 426]; Nazir Ahmad v. King-Emperor [AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) : 63 IA 372 : (1936) 37 Cri LJ 897] and ending with Chettiam Veettil Ammadv. Taluk Land Board [(1980) 1 SCC 499 : AIR 1979 SC 1573 : (1979) 3 SCR 839], laying down hitherto uncontroverted legal principle that where a statute requires to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.”

83. In Sharif-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone, (1980) 1 SCC

403, the Supreme Court held as follows:

“9… In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the court has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in question has to subserve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If the object of a law is to be defeated by non-compliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory… Whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not