W.P.(CRL) 2325/2017 Page 1 of 8

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

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Decided on: 5^th December, 2018

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W.P.(CRL) 2325/2017 and Crl. M.A. No.13146/2017 (stay)

ANTHONY JOSE

..... Petitioner

Represented by:

Ms. Bina Madhavan and Ms.

Akanksha Mehra, Advocate.

versus

STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS

..... Respondents

Represented by:

Mr. R.S. Kundu, Additional Standing

Counsel for State with Ms. Suman

Saharan and Mr. Bhagat Singh,

Advocates with ASI Aman Kumar,

PS CWC, Nanak Pura.

Mr. Jogy Scaria, Advocate for

respondent No.2.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA

MUKTA GUPTA, J. (ORAL)

1.

By this petition, petitioner prays as under:

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W.P.(CRL) 2325/2017 Page 2 of 8

2.

The grounds urged for seeking quashing of FIR No. 98/2017 under

Sections 498A/406/34 IPC registered at PS Crime (Women) Cell, Nanak

Pura, Delhi are that the FIR was registered to wreak vengeance and that it

was beyond the period of limitation as the parties separated from each other

in the year 2014. Parties admittedly resided together till August, 2014

whereafter they parted company and in 2015 the respondent No. 2 filed a

complaint before CAW Cell where a settlement was arrived at between the

parties in the pre-litigation mediation on 7^th April, 2016, however, the said

settlement was not fully acted upon and the parties drifted away from the

settlement, whereafter the complainant filed an application for revival of the

earlier complaint which was not revived as had been closed, thus she filed a

fresh complaint on 28^th July, 2017.

3.

Considering the facts noted above that within the period of limitation

of taking cognizance the complainant filed the complaint however, since

talks of settlement continued and arrived at but not fully acted upon and the

earlier complaint was not revived, the respondent No.2 was constrained to

file the second complaint, it cannot be said that the FIR in question is

beyond the period of limitation and thus liable to be quashed on that count.

4.

Section 468 Cr.P.C. reads as under:

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W.P.(CRL) 2325/2017 Page 3 of 8

5.

In (1993) 3 SCC 4 Vanka Radhamanohari Vs. Vanka Venkata Reddy

the Supreme Court dealing with the bar of Section 468 Cr.P.C.in relation to

the matrimonial offences held as under:

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W.P.(CRL) 2325/2017 Page 4 of 8

whether “it is necessary to do so in the interests of justice”.”

6.

In the decision reported as 2003 (68) DRJ 437 Asha Ahuja Vs. Rajesh

Ahuja & Ors. this Court dealing with the accused being discharged on the

ground of limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C. read with Section 473

Cr.P.C. held that Section 473 Cr.P.C. enjoins a duty upon the Court to

examine not only as to whether delay in filing of the FIR is explained or not

but also whether it is the requirement of justice to condone or ignore the

delay and in matrimonial cases if the bar of Section 468 Cr.P.C. is pleaded

the Court is required to apply its mind on the question as to whether it is

necessary to condone the delay in the interest of justice. In the said case

this Court considered the following reasons in the complaint to condone the

delay:

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W.P.(CRL) 2325/2017 Page 5 of 8

of the complaint under Section 498-A IPC.”

7.

Further, Supreme Court in (1999) 4 SCC 690 Arun Vyas Vs. Anita

Vyas held that the essence of the offence in Section 498-A is cruelty as

defined in the explanation appended to the said section and is a continuing

offence and on each occasion on which the respondent was subjected to

cruelty a new starting point of limitation arises. It was held:

CrPC.”