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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

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FAO (COMM) 34/2022 & CM APPL. 11054/2022

M/S SINGHAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT LLP FORMERLY

KNOWN AS SINGHAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT LIMITED

......Appellant

Through:

Mr Nityanand Singh, Mr Saurabh

Upadhyay, Advs.

M/S RELIGARE SECURITIES LTD. & ANR.

......Respondents

Through:

Mr Sachin Mittal, Adv.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SHAKDHER

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH

[Physical Court hearing/hybrid hearing (as per request)]

RAJIV SHAKDHER, J. (ORAL):

1.

We had heard the matter at some length on the first date i.e.,

04.03.2022.

1.1

On that date i.e., 04.03.2022, we had recorded the relevant dates and

events. The said order reads as follows:

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NEUTRAL CITATION NO: 2022/DHC/001357

matter at his request on10.03.2022.”

1.2.

Thus, the issue that we are required to consider is simply this, whether

the dismissal of the petitioner's petition, preferred under Section 34 of the

Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 [in short "the 1996 Act"] was tenable

in law?

2. However, before we proceed further, some important parameters need

to be set forth, as enunciated in law, to decide the issue at hand :

(i) Once limitation commences, it does not get interrupted.

(ii) The Limitation Act, 1963 (in short “the 1963 Act”) is applicable to

arbitration proceedings by virtue of Section 43 of the 1996 Act.

(iii) The limitation period prescribed for filing a petition under Section

34 of the 1996 Act, is three [3] months.

(iiia)

Since the 1996 Act does not define the expression "month", the

same will have the same meaning, as defined in Section 2(35) of the

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NEUTRAL CITATION NO: 2022/DHC/001357

General Clauses Act, 1897. The said section provides that the expression

"month" means a month reckoned according to the British calendar.

Where the period prescribed is a calendar month running from an

arbitrary date, it expires with the day in the succeeding month

immediately preceding the day, corresponding to the date upon which the

period starts, save and except where the period starts at the end of the

calendar month which contains more days than the succeeding month, the

period expires at the end of the latter month. [See Halsbury's Laws of

England Volume 37 (third edition)¹.]

(iiib)

However, the Supreme Court in the judgment rendered in State

of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers, (2010) 12 SCC 210, made the

following observations with regard to how the terminal date of the three

months timeframe should be ascertained :

(iiic)

The period of limitation commences from the date of receipt of

the award, or if a request under Section 33 of the 1996 Act is made, the

date on which the request is disposed of. Section 5 of the 1963 Act is not

applicable to proceedings instituted under 34 of the 1996 Act. [See

Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470.]

(iv) Section 14 of the 1963 Act is applicable to Section 34 proceedings,

1143 Calendar month running from arbitrary date. When the period prescribed is a

calendar month running from any arbitrary date the period expires with the day in the

succeeding month immediately preceding the day corresponding to the date upon which

the period starts; save that, if the period starts at the end of a calendar month which

contains more days than the next succeeding month, the period expires at the end of the

latter month (k).Also see Daryodh Singh vs. Union of India AIR 1973 Del 58,

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NEUTRAL CITATION NO: 2022/DHC/001357

preferred under the 1996 Act, provided the petitioner meets the requisite

criteria i.e., the proceedings are prosecuted with due diligence, the matter

in issue is the same, and was being taken forward in good faith in a court

which could not have entertained it on account of a defect in the

jurisdiction, or any other cause of like