SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

$~

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on: 28.01.2021 Pronounced on: 01.02.2021 + CRL.M.C. 2536/2020 & CRL.M.A. 17950/2020 SIMRANPAL SINGH SURI ..... Petitioner Through: Mr. M.S.Oberoi, Mr. Siddharth Khattar & Mr. Gaurav Rohilla, Advocates Versus STATE & ANR. ..... Respondents Through: Mr. Izhar Ahmed, Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1/State Mr. Anil Kumar Dhupar, Advocate for respondent No.2/complainant CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT

J U D G M E N T

2. As per the complaint, petitioner had borrowed a sum of Rs.10 Lacs, from respondent No.2, who had lent the same vide two cheques bearing Nos. 697399 and 697400, dated 26.02.2016, amounting to Rs.5 Lacs each, drawn on Punjab National Bank, Delhi Trade Finance Branch, Sadar Bazar, Delhi.

3. The order dated 26.09.2019 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, was challenged by petitioner vide Criminal Revision Petition No. 762/2019 and the Revisional Court vide impugned order dated 27.11.2020 dismissed the said petition with cost of Rs.50,000/-, which is under challenge in this petition.

4. At the hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint u/s 138 Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) filed by respondent No.2, without that being accompanied by application under Section 142 (b) NI Act for condoning the delay in filing the complaint. Learned counsel for petitioner further submitted that learned Metropolitan Magistrate, while taking cognizance of the complaint, did not take note of the fact that the complaint was filed beyond the limitation period and did not rightly calculate the days and therefore, direction to issue summons to the petitioner, is illegal and without jurisdiction.

5. In support of his case, learned counsel for petitioner relied upon decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rameshchandra Ambalal Joshi Vs.

State of Gujarat (2014) 11 SCC 759, which reads as under:-

“21. At this stage, we would also like to refer to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 37, 3rd Edn., Para 143 at p. 83 which provides for calculation of a calendar month:

<143. Calendar month running from arbitrary date.4When the period prescribed is a calendar month running from any arbitrary date the period expires with the day in the succeeding month immediately preceding the day corresponding to the date upon which the period starts; save that, if the period starts at the end of a calendar month which contains more days than the next succeeding month, the period expires at the end of the latter month.=

6. In addition, learned counsel for petitioner also relied upon Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, (1999) 4 SCC 567 in support of his case.

7. Learned counsel for respondent No.2/complainant opposed the present petition while submitting that the impugned order is well merited and petitioner has been rightly summoned in the complaint in question and, therefore, the impugned order does not call for any interference by this Court. However, he submitted that the decision in Rameshchandra Ambalal Joshi (Supra), has been rightly relied upon by counsel for petitioner as in the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also taken into consideration the British Calender while computing the period prescribed under Section 138 of the NI Act.

8. Learned counsel for second respondent further relied upon decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Saketh India Limited & Ors. Vs. M/s. India Securities Limited 1999 AIR Supreme Court 1090, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

“5. Afore-quoted Section 138 of the Act inter alia provides that where any cheque drawn by a person is returned by the bank unpaid, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence, however, it will apply, if the conditions mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) are satisfied. Section 142 further provides that the court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 on a written complaint made by the payee or the holder in due course, if such complaint is filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises. A month is to be reckoned according to the British calendar as defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897. The question would be, whether for calculating the period of one month which is prescribed under Section 142(b), the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top