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AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

Writ Petition (C) No.2151 of 2017

Smt Lalti Devi, Wd/o Late Sevalal, aged about 70 years, R/o

Village Chandan Nagar, Tahsil Prem Nagar, District Surajpur

(C.G.)

---- Petitioner

Versus

1. State of Chhattisgarh, through the Secretary, Revenue

Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, New Raipur (C.G.)

2. The State of Chhattisgarh, through Collector, Surajpur, District

Surajpur (C.G.)

3. The Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue), Surajpur, District Surajpur

(C.G.)

4. The Tahsildar, Premnagar, District Surajpur (C.G.)

5. Mahadeo, S/o Late Chhabinath, aged about 75, R/o Village

Chandan Nagar, Tahsil Prem Nagar, District Surajpur (C.G.)

---- Respondents

For Petitioner:

Mr. Ashok Kumar Shukla, Advocate.

For State/Respondents No.1 to 4: -

Mr. Arun Sao, Deputy Advocate General.

For Respondent No.5: Mr. Abhishek Sinha and Miss S. Harshita,

Advocates.

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

Order On Board

04/09/2017

1. By order dated 29-3-2017, the Tahsildar, Prem Nagar, has granted

temporary injunction restraining the petitioner from raising any

construction work till the partition is affected which has been

assailed by the petitioner before the Collector by filing revision and

the Collector has dismissed the revision and upheld the order

passed by the Tahsildar against which this writ petition has been

preferred.

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2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Tahsildar has

passed order on 29-3-2017 granting temporary injunction for which

he has no jurisdiction, therefore, the order passed by the Tahsildar

is without jurisdiction and without authority of law. He relies upon a

decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of

Maya Lalchandani (Mrs.) and others v. Board of Revenue and

others¹ in which the M.P. High Court has held as under: -

“4.

After going through the order passed by the

learned President, Board of Revenue and taking into

consideration the legal provisions, we are of the

opinion that the directions issued in paragraph 7 of the

order passed by the Board of Revenue cannot be

allowed to stand. Section 32 of the Land Revenue

Code talks of the inherent powers of the Revenue

Authorities while Section 43 talks of applicability of the

Code of Civil Procedure. It is to be seen from Section

32 that nothing in the Land Revenue Code shall be

deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power

of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be

necessary to meet the ends of justice or as may be

necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of

Court. Section 43 simply provides that unless

otherwise expressly provided in the Code, the

procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure

shall, so far as may be, followed in all proceedings

under the Code. Section 43 in no case would

authorize a Revenue Authority to grant an injunction.

Section 43 simply provides that the procedure laid

down in the Code of Civil Procedure so far as may be

followed in all proceedings under the Code. It is also to

be seen from the provision of the Code of Civil

Procedure that an injunction can be granted only by

civil Court and by none else. Section 32 of the M.P.

Land Revenue Code only talks of the inherent powers

of the Revenue Courts where they are required to

make such order as may be necessary for the ends of

justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the

Court. The powers under Section 32 can be exercised

within the Code itself and not beyond the Code. If the

Revenue Authority does not have the power to grant

injunction then the Board of Revenue also could not

grant injunction.”

3. Mr. Sao, learned Deputy Advocate General, and Mr. Abhishek

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2009 (3) MPLJ 660

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Sinha, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5, would rely

upon Section 178 (1-A) of the Chhattisgarh Land Re