Order On Board

09/09/2021 This is repeat bail application. Earlier application was rejected by this Court on merits.

1. Learned counsel for the applicant would submit that the repeat application has been filed mainly on the ground of delay in trial as also witnesses of seizure have not supported the case making the case of the prosecution highly doubtful and also possibility of false implication.

2. On the other hand, learned State counsel would submit that earlier bail application was rejected on merits and it is a case of commercial quantity. Further submission is that the investigating officer has not been examined so far.

3. Taking into consideration the submission of learned counsel for the parties, particularly taking into consideration the order of this Court in the case of Punit Ram Pandey and ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh (MCRC No. 1158 of 2020) decided on 29/01/2021, this Court is not inclined to grant bail only on the ground of delay. In the aforesaid case, relying upon judgment of the Supreme Court, it was held-

“6. This Court finds that the applicants have remained in jail for about two years and trial has not been concluded till date. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Sanawar Ali (supra). In that case, on facts, it was found that the accused had remained in detention for more than 5 years and trial had not been concluded. Applying the directions issued by the Supreme court in the case of Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India and ors. (1994) 6 SCC 731, bail was granted to the accused on that ground alone.

In the case of Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (supra), an issue arose for consideration as to whether in view of bar created under Section 37 of NDPS, undertrial prisoners should be admitted to bail only on the ground of delay in trial. The Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with the situation where the accused charged of commission of offence under NDPS Act were in jail and trial was being inordinately delayed. It was observed as below -

“15. …........We are conscious of the statutory provision finding place in Section 37 of the Act prescribing the conditions which have to be satisfied before a person accused of an offence under the Act can be released. Indeed we have adverted to this section in the earlier part of the judgment. We have also kept in mind the interpretation placed on a similar provision in Section 20 of the TADA Act by the Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569. Despite this provision, we have directed as above mainly at the call of Article 21 as the right to speedy trial may even require in some cases quashing of a criminal proceeding altogether, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S.Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225, release on bail, which can be taken to be embedded in the right of speedy trial, may, in some cases be the demand of Article 21. As we have not felt inclined to accept the extreme submission of quashing the proceedings and setting free the accused whose trials have been delayed beyond reasonable time for reasons already alluded to, we have felt that deprivation of the personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial would also not be in consonance with the right guaranteed by Article 21. Of course, some amount of deprivation of personal liberty cannot be avoided in such cases; but if the period of deprivation pending trial becomes unduly long, the fairness assured by Article 21 would receive a jolt. It is because of this that we have felt that after the accused persons have suffered imprisonment which is half of the maximum punishment provided for the offence, any further deprivation of personal liberty would be violative of the fundamental right visualised by Article 21, which has to be telescoped with the right guaranteed by Article 14 which also promises justness, fairness and reasonableness in procedural matters. Wh